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PRETRIAL RELEASE OF PUBLIC
DRUNKENNESS OFFENDERS IN CALIFORNIA
James R. Woods*
INTRODUCTION
Approximately two million arrests are made for the offense
of public drunkenness each year in the United States.' Nearly
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1. Recent statistics from FBI Uniform Crime Reports list the following ar-
rests for public drunkenness:
1964 1,458,821 1969 1,420,161
1965 1,516,548 1970 1,512,672
1966 1,485,562 1971 1,491,787
1967 1,517,809 1972 1,384,735
1968 1,415,961 1973 1,189,489
However, as Raymond T. Nimmer in his work entitled Two Million Unneces-
sary Arrests observes, when these figures are adjusted to reflect arrests made by
non-reporting jurisdictions, an estimate in excess of two million annual arrests for
public drunkenness can be projected. R. NIMMER, Two MILLION UNNECESSARY
ARRESTS 155 n.2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as NIMMER]. An undetermined num-
ber of additional arrests for drunkenness are made under disorderly conduct, va-
grancy, loitering, and related statutes. TASK FORCE ON DRUNKENNESS, THE PRES-
IDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
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a quarter of a million of these arrests are made in California.' The
magnitude of the problem is illustrated by estimates that one out
of three arrests in the nation is for drunkenness.8  Public drunk-
enness clearly stands as a social problem of staggering quantita-
tive dimensions, profoundly influencing the criminal justice sys-
tem.
Many jurisdictions subject virtually every individual arrested
for drunkenness to the entire criminal process. The President's
Commission or Law Enforcement and Administration of Jus-
tice in its Task Force Report: Drunkenness observes that
[t]he great volume of these arrests places an extremely
heavy load on ,the operations of the criminal justice system.
It burdens police, clogs lower criminal courts, and crowds
penal institutions throughout the United States.
4
Perhaps the greatest paradox, however, lies with the effect
that the existing system has upon the individual drunkenness of-
fender. The President's Commission concludes:
The criminal justice system appears ineffective to deter
drunkenness or to meet the problems of -the chronic alcoholic
offender. What the system usually does accomplish is to re-
move the drunk from public view, detoxify him, and provide
him with food, shelter, emergency medical service, and a brief
period of forced sobriety. As presently constituted, the sys-
tem is not in a position to meet his underlying medical and
social problems.8
The Purpose of Arrest for Public Drunkenness
Historically, criminal sanctions on public intoxication were
erected to protect the public from a nuisance as well as from seri-
ous crimes which were thought to have a direct relation to intoxi-
TASK FORCE REPORT: DRUNKENNESS I n.1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESI-
DENT'S REPORT: DRUNKENNESS].
2. The California Bureau of Criminal Statistics reports the following number
of arrests for drunkenness:
1968 244,154 1971 241,727
1969 267,719 1972 220,848
1970 254,877
CALIFORNIA BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN CAL-
IFORNIA 35, Table 7 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 1972).
3. PRESIDENT'S REPORT: DRUNKENNESS, supra note 1, at 1. Nimmer sug-
gests that this figure is closer to 40 percent nationally. NIMMER, supra note 1,
at 1. In California, in 1972, there was a total of 1,340,438 arrests reported
(adult/juvenile, felony/misdemeanor). CALIFORNIA BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATIS-
TICS, CRIMES AND ARRESTS 5, 6, 7, Tables 2-A, 3-A, 4-A (1972) [hereinafter cited
as CRIMES AND ARRES'S 1972]. Of those arrests, 220,848 were for drunkenness.
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 1972, supra note 2, at 35. Thus, 16.5 percent of all the
arrests in California (or about one in every six arrests) were for drunkenness.
4. PRESIDENT'S REPORT: DRUNKENNESS, supra note 1, at 1.
5. Id. at 3.
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cation.' Whatever the initial social or legislative philosophy that
motivated the imposition of criminal sanctions upon public drunk-
enness, today the function of the arrest process serves a substan-
tially different purpose. While it is still viewed as proper to in-
voke the total criminal process when a drunk is arrested for ac-
tually causing harm to others, or for making an extreme nuisance
of himself, or for being habitually drunk in public, it is also the
current practice to impose criminal sanctions for the protection
of the one arrested, because he needs shelter from the cold, be-
cause he needs medical assistance, or because he is likely prey
for a common "jackroller. ' 7
Informal Processes to Achieve Arrest Purposes
Wayne LaFave, in his book Arrest," discovered that a num-
ber of informal procedures are frequently employed at the initial
stages of the criminal justice process when someone is found pub-
licly intoxicated. LaFave observed that:
These [informal] accomodations often result from
frustrations brought about by requirements of law which the
administrators believe are excessively difficult to comply with
or by an absence of adequate resources to invoke the entire
criminal justice process. 9
LaFave further observed that it is thought that this truncated
process satisfactorily achieves the objectives of the system, especi-
ally in light of limited personnel and facilities and -the excessive
costs of the criminal justice system.' 0
6. Stanford University Institute for the Study of Human Problems, Public
Drunkenness as a Crime, May 15, 1963 (unpublished manuscript on file at Stan-
ford University as #37:5/14/63).
7. See NIMMER, supra note 1, at 35 for a similar analysis of the purposes
of arrest for public drunkenness. A "jackroller" is an individual who makes his
living by robbing helpless or passed out drunks. Often a "jackroller" will take
money, personal property or even a man's clothes. Police claim that by arresting
the helpless or passed out drunks, the number of strongarm robberies will be di-
minished.
8. W. IAFAvE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY
11-12 (1965) [hereinafter cited as LAFAvE].
9. ld. at 11.
10. Id. For example, LaFave indicates that in Detroit, police may classify
non-habitual offenders as "Golden Rule Drunks." In such cases an individual is
released when sober. Also, in Milwaukee, non-habitual offenders may be released
when sober upon payment of $4.35. The individual does not need to appear in
court. Id. at 440-43. For further descriptions of various criminal justice systems
and alternatives for public drunkenness offenders, see NIMMER, supra note 1.
Nimmer's survey includes observations in Chicago, New York City, St. Louis, and
Washington, D.C. Also for an interesting brief description of how European
countries treat public drunkenness offenders, see Tongue, Police Handling of the
Drunkenness Offender in Some European Cities, THE DRUNKENNESS OFFENSE 135
(T. Cook ed. 1969). Tongue's article includes reports on Warsaw, Prague, Paris,
Vienna, Milan, West Berlin, Sweden, Finland, and the United Kingdom.
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Alternatives to Formal Criminal Process in California
Public drunkenness has been made a crime in California
under Penal Code section 647(f).11 This section provides that
everyone is guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor,
who is found in any public place under the influence of in-
,toxicating liquor. . . in such a condition that he is unable to
exercise care for his own safety or the safety of others, or...
interferes with or obstructs or prevents the free use of any
street, sidewalk, or other public way.' 2
In an attempt to diminish the burden of public drunkenness
on the criminal justice system in California, while fulfilling basic
informal objectives of the arrest process, the Legislature has en-
acted Penal Code sections 849(b)(2) and 647(fo. Section 849
(b)(2) provides that:
11. CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(f) (West Supp. 1974).
12. Id. It is not the purpose of this article to assess the constitutionality of
public drunkenness statutes in general; however, some comment is in order. In
the cases of Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966) and Easter v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966) the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits held on constitutional and statutory
grounds that a chronic alcoholic could not be punished for public drunkenness.
In the subsequent case of Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), however, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that a chronic alcoholic's conviction for being
drunk in public did not violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
eighth amendment. Faced with the reality that there is no known generally ef-
fective method of treatment or adequate facilities or manpower for a full-scale
attack on the enormous problem of alcoholics, the Court was unwilling to assert
that the use of the criminal process to deal with the public aspects of problem
drinking could never be defended as rational. The Court stated,
It would be tragic to return large numbers of helpless, sometimes danger-
ous and frequently unsanitary inebriates to the streets of our cities with-
out even the opportunity to sober up adequately which a brief jail term
provides.
392 U.S. at 528. Additionally, citing the PRESIDENT'S REPORT: DRUNKENNESS,
supra note 1, the Court observed that
the "strongest barrier" to the abandonment of the current use of the
criminal process to deal with public intoxication is that there presently
are no clear alternatives for taking into custody and treating those who
are now arrested as drunks.
392 U.S. at 528 n.22. Similarly, the constitutionality of California Penal Code
section 647(f) has been attacked on the ground that it constitutes cruel and un-
usual punishment, but this argument was rejected in In re Spinks, 253 Cal. App.
2d 748, 61 Cal. Rptr. 743 (1967).
Although it appears that it is not per se unconstitutional to apply public
drunkenness statutes to chronic alcoholics, such statutes might be attacked on the
ground that they are void for vagueness. In this connection, the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments invalidate legislative enactments
so obscure in their prohibitions that persons potentially subject to them cannot
know with fair assurance how to act in order to avoid liability. See, most re-
cently, Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
However, courts have refused thus far to find the California statute constitution-
ally defective on the ground of vagueness. People v. Kemick, 17 Cal. App. 3d
419, 94 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1971); In re Joseph G., 7 Cal. App. 3d 695, 701-02, 87
Cal. Rptr. 25, 28-29 (1970).
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(b) Any peace officer may release from custody, instead of
taking such person before a magistrate, any person arrested
without a warrant whenever:
(2) The person arrested was arrested for intoxication only,
and no further proceedings are desirable. 18
In addition to the informal processing of drunkenness offend-
ers contemplated by section 849(b)(2), the Legislature has
provided in Penal Code section 647 the option of alternate pro-
cessing of public inebriates through civil detoxification centers
rather than through the criminal justice system. 4 Accordingly,
in localities where such centers are in operation, a person whose
only offense is a violation of the public drunkenness statute may
avoid both arrest and jail. The practical effect of the statute is
the decriminalization of the offense of public drunkenness. 1 It
should be noted, however, that rarely does this alternative
completely supersede the traditional arrest procedure.
13. CAL. PEN. CODE § 849(b)(2) (West Supp. 1974). Section 849(b)(2)
was enacted in 1957. Cal. Stats. (1957), ch. 2147, § 6, at 3806. In 1969 an
amendment deleted section 849(b)(3) which read: "The person arrested was ar-
rested for a misdemeanor, and has signed an agreement to appear in court or be-
fore a magistrate at a place and time designated as provided in this code." Cal.
Stats. (1969), ch. 1259, § 1, at 2459.
14. CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(ff) (West Supp. 1974). Section 647(ff) was
added in 1971 and provides as follows:
When a person has violated subdivision (f) of this section, a peace
officer, if he is reasonably able to do so, shall place the person, or cause
him to be placed, in civil protective custody. Such person shall be taken
to a facility, designated pursuant to Section 5170 of the Welfare and In-
stitutions Code, for the 72-hour treatment and evaluation of inebriates.
A peace officer may place a person in civil protective custody with that
kind and degree of force which would be lawful were he effecting an
arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant. No person.who has been
placed in civil protective custody shall thereafter be subject to any crim-
inal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding based on the facts giving
rise to such placement. This subdivision shall not apply to the follow-
ing persons:
(1) Any person who is under the influence of any drug, or under the
combined influence of intoxicating liquor and any drug.
(2) Any person who a peace officer has probable cause to believe has
committed any felony, or who has committed any misdemeanor in
addition to subdivision (f) of this section.
(3) Any person who a peace officer in good faith believes will attempt
escape or will be unreasonably difficult for medical personnel to
control.
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5170 (West Supp. 1974) states:
When any person is a danger to others, or to himself, or gravely
disabled as a result of inebriation, a peace officer, member of the attend-
ing staff, as defined by regulation, of an evaluation facility designated
by the county, or other person designated by the county may, upon Tea-
sonable cause, take, or cause to be taken the person into civil protective
custody and place him in a facility designated by the county and ap-
proved by the State Department of Health as a facility for 72-hour treat-
ment and evaluation of inebriates.
15. Professor Packer believes that informal treatment of public inebriates
should be taken even one step further so that arrests and prosecutions are discon-
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SCOPE OF EXAMINATION
This article explores the interpretation and implementation
of Penal Code sections 647(f), 849(b)(2) and 647(ff) by Cali-
fornia police agencies. The issues addressed include: When
are arrests made for public drunkenness in California? When do
police deem that "no further proceedings are desirable" in public
drunkenness cases? How is it determined who is to be referred to
civil detoxification centers? What are the legal implications of
present-day practices? Finally, when should no further proceed-
ings be desirable, and who should be referred to civil detoxifica-
tion centers.
The information utilized in the preparation of this article was
gathered from sources representing over 450 police agencies
throughout the state encompassing a period of more than eight
years. Additionally, interviews with police, public health officials,
the Salvation Army, judges, court officials and arrestees were con-
ducted over a four year period. In all, twelve California cities
were visited. 16 Five of these cities-San Francisco, Oakland, Los
Angeles, San Diego and Fresno-were chosen for in-depth re-
search and investigation. These cities were focused on because
within their jurisdictions nearly half of the state's drunkenness ar-
rests are made each year. 17
This article takes the position that the California Legislature,
through Penal Code sections 849(b)(2) and 647(ff), has pro-
vided a practical and constitutional means for diminishing the bur-
den of public drunkenness on the criminal justice system, while
fulfilling the objectives of the arrest process and meeting the
needs of the public inebriate. For the most part, however, police
tinued completely. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 259,
345-47 (1968).
16. Cities visited included San Francisco, Oakland, Berkeley, Los Angeles,
Santa Monica, Pasadena, San Diego, Fresno, Redwood City, San Mateo, Davis
and Sacramento.
17. For example, in 1972 there was a total of 220,848 statewide adult arrests
for drunkenness. CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 1972, supra note 2, at 35. In that
year, according to California Bureau of Criminal Statistics arrest files, there were
15,447 drunkenness arrests made in San Francisco, 6,401 in Oakland, 64,451 in
Los Angeles, 8,680 in San Diego, and 14,086 in Fresno. This total of 109,065
comprised 49.4% of the state-wide total.
Arrest/release statistics generally are obtainable from two sources: the arrest
files of the Bureau of Criminal Statistics, California Department of Justice, and
the arrest files of the particular police agency. Although statistics from these
sources for the total number of arrests may vary slightly, release statistics are of-
ten substantially different, due to different methods of reporting. For purposes
of consistency and accuracy, data from the Bureau of Criminal Statistics will be
used unless interviews with police officials have indicated that the Bureau's statis-
tics are inaccurate or likely to distort the true statistical picture (in which case
statistics from the individual police agency will be used).
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departments have failed to implement -these informal alternatives
in a uniform and effective manner because of an absence of objec-
tive guidelines from the Legislature and the municipal courts.
Accordingly, by focusing upon the demands of the system
and the needs of the individual, this article tenders a classification
model for drunkenness offenders and suggests some statutory
amendments for implementing these alternatives in a uniform and
effective manner. It does not recommend abandoning the crim-
inal framework for processing public inebriates, at least until ade-
quate civil resources are developed to handle the volume of public
intoxication cases. However, it does advocate diminishing utiliza-
tion of the total criminal process in drunkenness cases. In this
connection, the article questions the propriety and necessity of
utilizing the court process in circumstances where police agencies
and detoxification facilities are capable of substantially achieving
municipal court objectives.
THE EXISTING SYSTEM UNDER SECTIONS
647(f), 849(b) (2) AND 647(ff)
California Penal Code section 647(f) may apply to anyone
who is found in public under the influence of alcohol and who
either: (1) is unable to exercise care for his own safety or the
safety of others; or (2) is found interfering with the free use of
any street, sidewalk, or other public way. i8 However, in most
California cities observed, not everyone found to be technically
guilty of violating section 647(f) is arrested. Oftentimes poten-
tial arrestees are escorted home or are simply ignored. 9
In this regard, the President's Crime Commission reports:
Drunkenness arrest practices vary from place to place.
Some police departments strictly enforce drunkenness stat-
utes, while other departments are known to be more tolerant.
In fact, the number of arrests in a city may be related less to
-the amount of public drunkenness than to police policy.20
Raymond Nimmer in his work Two Million Unnecessary Arrests
argues that "this begs an important question, leaving unanswered
the issues of the basis for these different policies and why they
are tolerated in various cities."'" Nimmer suggests ,that practices
are shaped by a complex interaction of three factors: protective
(desiring to deal with violence on skid row by removing potential
victims), paternalistic (employing the arrest process to remove
18. CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(f) (West Supp. 1974).
19. Conversely, during a skid row sweep, it often happens that some individu-
als who do not exhibit conduct violative of § 647(f) nevertheless are picked up.
20. PRESIDENT'S REPORT: DRUNKENNESS, supra note 1, at 2.
21. NIMMER, supra note 1, at 9.
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weak men from the streets to shelter), and aesthetic (responding
to perceived community pressures to minimize the visibility to the
public of the skid row inebriate).22
In California, factors similar to those described by Nimmer
appear to influence the decision to arrest public inebriates. This
author questioned twelve metropolitan California law enforcement
agencies regarding their purposes for arresting drunks. 23  The
vast majority of the officials interviewed consistently included the
above stated reasons for arrest: to protect the individual from
hurting himself or being robbed by others; to dry him out and
to offer him medical assistance if necessary; and to clean up the
streets. Unlike Nimmer's survey, however, there appears to be
less variation in the arrest influencing factors in the California
cities observed by this author. Perhaps a prime reason for the
rather uniform influence of all these factors in California is their
apparent codification in section 647(0 of the Penal Code.24
That is, a person is to be arrested only if found under the in-
fluence of alcohol and (1) unable to exercise care for his or her
own safety or the safety of others (protective and paternalistic
considerations); or (2) interfering with the free use of any street,
sidewalk, or other public way (essentially an aesthetic considera-
tion).
Moreover, an additional factor should be added to Nimmer's
model: convenience. The degree of inconvenience to the arrest-
ing officer of processing a drunkenness offender through the crim-
inal justice system can be considerable and varies substantially
among different jurisdictions.2" This factor may be determinative
of whether a drunkenness arrest is made; but in California, be-
cause of the minimal amount of time required to process drunken-
ness arrests, this factor does not appear to be so important.
Since the late 1960's, California police agencies have experi-
enced fundamental changes with regard to the processing of pub-
lic inebriates, in large part due to the fact that arrests for drunken-
ness are declining, release rates under section 849(b)(2) are
rising, and referral policies pursuant to section 647(ff) are begin-
22. Id. at 35.
23. These included police and/or sheriff's departments in San Francisco, Oak-
land, Berkeley, San Mateo, Redwood City, Los Angeles, Santa Monica, Pasadena,
San Diego and Fresno (Jul.-Aug., 1970).
24. CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(f) (West Supp. 1974).
25. For example, it takes a New York police officer an average of nine hours
and forty minutes to process an arrest case in New York, while it takes merelyforty-five minutes for an officer to process a case in Oakland. Feeney & Woods,A Comparative Description of the New York and California Criminal Justice Sys-
tems: Arrest Through Arraignment, 26 VAND. L. REV. 973, 1019 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Feeney & Woods]. The processing of public inebriates in Oakland
takes even less time. Id. at 1005 n.87.
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ning to develop. The reasons for a decline in the arrest rate of
drunkenness offenders2" include: the lower priority that police
agencies are assigning to the arrest of drunkenness offenders due
to the belief that more important functions can be performed with
an officer's time and that little is accomplished by making such
arrests; the trend away from officers walking a beat to patrolling
a beat in a car, bringing the officer in less frequent contact with
potential drunkenness arrestees; the development of a civil detoxi-
fication alternative to the arrest-prosecution process; a stricter ad-
herence to the requirements demanded of Penal Code section 647
(f), thus diminishing an emphasis on skid row sweeps and arrests
for reasons other than public intoxication under the statute; and
the diminished judicial interest in the prosecution of public drunk-
enness cases and the corresponding effect upon police policies re-
garding drunkenness arrests.2 7
Paralleling the decline in the drunkenness arrest rate, is the
decline in the number of drunkenness offenders who are being
processed through California courts. This decline is related to
the increased use of Penal Code sections 849(b)(2) and 647(ff)
as dispositional alternatives.28 In this author's judgment there are
several reasons for the increased use of section 849(b)(2) in
California. First, fewer departments appear to believe that there
is a legitimate purpose for processing every drunkenness offender
through court. This attitude was reflected in a sample survey of
police and sheriffs departments.2 9 When asked, "Does the crim-
inal process help the individuals arrested?", the general answer
was, "No. You see the same guys every night, over and over
again. About all we can do is get them periodically off the street
and dried out.""0  Second, in some jurisdictions, judicial decisions
26. Over the period 1968-1972 arrests for drunkenness declined by fourteen
percent. CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 1972, supra note 2, at 35, Table 7. See also
Taking the Public Inebriate Out of California's Criminal Justice System, 7
U.C.D.L. REv. 539, 544-46 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Public Inebriate].
27. For a similar analysis which lists yet other reasons for the decline, see
Public Inebriate, supra note 26, at 543-44.
28. Statewide figures concerning the use of section 647(ff) are not available.
However, figures showing statewide use of section 849(b) (2) are available.
Arrests for 849(b)(2) '% Arrestees % Arrestees Processed
647(f) Releases Released Through Court
1969 267,719 38,152 14.3 85.7
1972 220,848 42,903 20.3 79.7
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 1972, supra note 2, at 35, Table 7; California Bureau
of Criminal Statistics arrest files. The percentage of arrestees processed through
court is an estimate since it does not exclude a minor number of police referrals
of arrestees to out-of-state jurisdictions. A total of 1,386 or 0.6% were trans-
ferred in 1972; referral figures are not available for 1969.
29. For a list of departments sampled see note 23 supra.
30. Interview with Officer John Larsen, Court Liaison, San Francisco Police
Department, in San Francisco, July, 1970. This opinion coincides closely with
1974]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
have effected the increased use of section 849(b)(2) as a disposi-
tional alternative to prosecution.8 Third, police agencies are be-
coming more aware of the administrative benefits that may be
derived from increased use of the section.3 2  Fourth, pressure
from citizens' groups has influenced police to seek dispositional
alternatives to prosecution of public inebriates. Finally, the en-
actment of section 647(ff) has given added strength to the legisla-
tive pronouncement that further proceedings are not necessarily
desirable in all drunkenness cases.
Although many of the police agencies observed are increas-
ing the use of release without prosecution under section 849(b)
(2), current police policies and practices in California indicate
that a substantially inconsistent interpretation of section 849(b)
(2) prevails. The result is that widely varied policies and imple-
mentation procedures have developed throughout the state. In
effect, little or no uniformity appears to exist in determining when
"no further proceedings are desirable." Consequently, some de-
partments have opted to apply the statute in as many as 85 per
cent of their drunkenness cases, while others have neglected total-
ly to exercise it."8
Under section 647(ff), in most jurisdictions the existence of
a nominal number of detoxification beds (as is presently the case
in many counties) has not altered the more traditional arrest proc-
ess. Despite the mandatory language that a police officer shall,
if he is reasonably able to do so, refer an individual to a detox
center if one is available, many police opt to refer only those few
inebriates arrested whom they determine to be most in need of
the detoxification alternative. This decision may be accomplished
by asking for volunteers or by selecting those drunks who look
"the worst." Accordingly, the referral for treatment alternative
that of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration
of Justice. See generally PRESIDENT'S REPORT: DRUNKENESS, supra note 1. See
also text accompanying note 5, supra.
31. The case of Crazyhawk v. Municipal Court effectively baited the prosecu-
tion of section 647(f) cases in Alameda County. Crazyhawk v. Municipal Court,
Civil No. 431050 (Super. Ct., Alameda County, April 13, 1973), appeal filed, Ci-
vil No. 33522, 1st Dist., July 13, 1973. The implications of this case are dis-
cussed infra at text accompanying notes 58-68 and 156-86.
32. Such benefits include relieving pressure on both the jail and the court cre-
ated by the volume of drunkenness offenders; decreasing transportation, shelter,
food and supervision costs; and diminishing the number of trial appearances made
by police officers. Interview with officers of the Fresno Police and Sheriff's De-
partments, in Fresno, Aug. 1971.
33. The Stockton Police Department reported releasing 4,234 of 4,958 indi-
viduals arrested for public drunkenness (85.4%) in 1972. The Los Angeles
County Sheriff's Department, however, arrested 9,402 individuals but released




under 647(ff) frequently is applied with little more uniformity
than the release alternative pursuant to section 948(b)(2).
POLICE POLICIES AND PRACTICES REGARDING PENAL CODE
SECTIONS 647 (f), 849(b)(2) AND 647 (ff)
IN SELECTED CALIFORNIA CITIES
The existing procedures which have developed as a result
of Penal Code sections 647(f), 849(b)(2), and 647(ff) are
exemplified by the policies and practices observed in those cities
that were selected for in-depth research and investigation-San
Francisco, Oakland, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Fresno. In
order to place current policies and practices in perspective and
to assist in noting areas of change, statistical data from two sample
years-1969 and 1972-are provided. 4
A. San Francisco
While the arrest policy for public inebriates by the San Fran-
cisco Police Department remains essentially the same for 1969
and 1972, the release policy pursuant to Penal Code section 849
(b)(2) is in a state of transition, and a referral policy under sec-
tion 647(ff) is just beginning to develop.
1. Departmental arrest policy. The San Francisco Police
Department policy for determining which drunks to arrest for vio-
lating Penal Code section 647 (f) depends upon the circumstances
which give rise to the arrest."
Acting upon citizens' complaints which usually originate from
merchants in the skid row or near skid row business districts, the
police department will begin making sporadic sweeps of the area,
arresting anyone found to be drunk on the street if complaints
are frequent. If the object of a citizen's complaint is merely a
lone offender who is "down and out," the beat officer or a patrol
car will be dispatched to make the arrest.
Without the request of a complaining citizen, San Francisco
relies upon the discretion of its beat officers and periodic skid row
sweeps to conduct drunkenness arrests. Normally, a beat officer
will arrest a drunk only if he demonstrates an inability to care
34. These years were chosen for several reasons: 1972 represents the latest
available statewide statistical information; 1969 reflects practices and policies
prior to the enactment of section 647(ff); the three year separation of these sam-
ple years is helpful in detecting trends; and the use of statistics from two differ-
ent years facilitates a comparison of the trends in implementation of the public
inebriate statutes in each city. Data from other years are provided when helpful
to illustrate a particular point.
35. Interviews with Officer John Larsen, Court Liaison, San Francisco Police
Department, in San Francisco, Jul.-Aug., 1970, Aug., 1972 and June, 1974.
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for himself or substantially interferes with the street or sidewalk
traffic in the area. Even then, an officer will often attempt to
take the man home rather than arrest him. Consequently, most
drunks are arrested when one of the four daily skid row sweeps
takes place. Although during a skid row sweep virtually anyone
found exhibiting signs of intoxication will be arrested, the prime
concern is for those who display little ability to care for them-
selves. Accordingly, the beat officer often leads the paddy wa-
gon by a block or two, warning those regular drunks he sees to
get off the streets before they are "run in." If they are able to
"beat the wagon" they are deemed sober enough to require no
arrest. 6
The arrest practice in San Francisco appears to be based
upon all of the factors outlined in Nimmer's modela 7  However,
the Department's emphasis upon the use of skid row sweeps and
the manner in which these are accomplished may indicate that
the paternalistic and protective factors are most influential. This
conclusion is reinforced by the fact that in paddy wagon sweeps
at 5 a.m. and 5 p.m., drunks are picked up and taken to a detoxi-
fication center rather than to a drunk tank.36  Although indi-
viduals are picked up under the authority of section 647(0, they
are not taken into civil protective custody and detained for 72
hours as contemplated by the statute. Instead, they are released
from the detoxification center as soon as they are able. As a
result, many of these individuals are rearrested later in the same
day. 39
Although -the total number of drunkenness arrests and the
percentage of these arrests compared with total misdemeanor ar-
rests have remained relatively stable for the past several years,40
it remains to be seen what impact the use of "detox" centers will
have upon the arrest rate.41
36. Id.
37. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
38. Since February, 1974, San Francisco has operated a detoxification center
that handles ten police arrest/referrals a day. Public Inebriate, supra note 26,
at 547. Additionally, in June, 1974, another "detox" center became operative.
Interview with Officer John Larsen, Court Liaison, San Francisco Police Depart-
ment, in San Francisco, June, 1974.
39. Interview with Officer John Larsen, Court Liaison, San Francisco Police
Department, in San Francisco, June, 1974.
40. California Bureau of Criminal Statistics arrest files show that total arrests
for public drunkenness in San Francisco for 1969 and 1972 were 16,839 and
15,447, respectively. San Francisco Police Department statistics for 1973 show
a further decline in the arrest total to 14,618. In 1969, section 647(f) arrests
comprised 54.5 percent of the total misdemeanor arrests in San Francisco. In
1972 this percentage dropped slightly to 48.9. Bureau of Criminal Statistics arrest
files. Similar percentages seem to indicate a relatively stable departmental pri-
ority for the arrest of drunkenness offenders.
41. Technically, under section 647(ff) persons referred to detoxification cen-
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2. Departmental release/referral policy. As indicated,
the release/referral policy of the San Francisco Police Depart-
ment is in a state of transition. In 1969, the San Francisco Police
Department made 16,839 arrests for violations of Penal Code sec-
tion 647(f). 2  Of the total, 1,415 individuals were released pur-
suant to Penal Code section 849(b)(2). 4' The number released
comprised 8.4 percent of the total arrested for drunkenness.
However, as a result of a new release policy initiated in Novem-
ber, 1971, the number released in 1972 rose to 41.9 percent, and
in 1973 this figure reached 50 percent.
44
In 1969, the policy for releasing individuals prior to court
under section 849(b)(2) was predicated on only two grounds:
medical necessity and overcrowding of jail facilities. 45  The rea-
ters are placed in civil protective custody. Accordingly, widespread referrals to
detoxification centers would appear to have the effect of lowering the arrest rate.
This is really more a matter of form than substance, however, since officer in-
volvement is demanded under a section 647(ff) referral just as it is under a 647(f)
arrest. In fact, the amount of officer involvement conceivably could be greater
under a section 647(ff) referral procedure depending upon the location of the de-
toxification facility. For instance, if the facility is located a substantial distance
from where the officer traditionally processes drunkenness arrestees and if it is
frequently filled, the referring officer could find himself spending considerable
time ascertaining available space and delivering the individual to the facility. Re-
ferral procedures, however, could be streamlined to make them more efficient.
Additionally, it is not clear what impact the "detox" center will have upon the
arrest/re-arrest or referral/re-referral cycles. The present use of detoxification fa-
cilities in San Francisco appears to amplify the revolving door pattern since
many individuals are re-arrested later in the same day. However, if referrals were
to be detained for the 72 hours contemplated by section 647(ff), the revolving
door cycle would be interrupted for a longer period. But increased detention
would also decrease the capacity of the facility to handle referrals.
42. Bureau of Criminal Statistics arrest files. The San Francisco Committee
on Crime, in its Report on Non-Victim Crime in San Francisco, noted that the
"peak year" for drunk arrests in San Francisco during the past thirty years was
1950. In that year there were 45,913 such arrests. The Committee also observed
that of 58,540 total arrests by the San Francisco Police Department in 1967,
nearly 35 percent were drunk arrests. For purposes of comparison, the Commit-
tee noted that in 1967, 36 percent of the reported arrests in Washington, D.C.,
66 percent in Boston, and 2.5 percent in St. Louis were for drunkenness. The
Committee cautioned, however, that,
[a]rrest statistics depend on (1) police interpretation of city ordinances;
(2) whether there is a detoxification center; (3) whether arrests for
drunkenness are made under some other charge, such as vagrancy; and
(4) whether it is police policy to make drunk arrests regularly.
SAN FRANCISCO COMMITrEE ON CRIME, A REPORT ON NON-VICTIM CRIME IN
SAN FRANCISCO, PART I, BASIC PRINCIPLES: PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS 17 (April 26,
1971) [hereinafter cited as SAN FRANCISCO CRIME REPORT]. See note 40 supra
for a present-day comparison of section 647(f) arrests with total misdemeanor ar-
rests in San Francisco.
43. Bureau of Criminal Statistics arrest files.
44. Bureau of Criminal Statistics arrest files for 1972 list 15,447 arrests and
6,475 releases in San Francisco. For 1973 the San Francisco Police Department
reported 14,618 arrests and 7,331 releases.
45. Interviews with Officer John Larsen, Court Liaison, San Francisco Police
Department, in San Francisco, Jul.-Aug., 1970.
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son for releasing those in need of medical assistance was primarily
financial. By releasing all those in need of medical assistance
prior to hospitalization, the community at large bears the cost of
the individual's care as opposed to the municipal police depart-
ment. Originally, medical examinations were given at San Fran-
cisco General Hospital to those who were picked up unconscious,
but there was no routine inspection of drunks who were brought
to the "tank" at city prison. 6 However, subsequent efforts of the
San Francisco Crime Committee brought about the implementa-
tion of a medical plan to deal with emergency medical problems 7
and to determine who should be released for medical reasons.4"
If a drunk arrestee is in need of medical attention, the book-
ing sergeant places a call to the on-duty steward located inside
the city prison. The responding steward decides if first aid is suf-
ficient or if the situation dictates transfer to the county hospital.
Usually 75 to 85 percent of those thought to need medical atten-
tion can be handled within the jail by the doctor or steward.
Cases which typically are referred to San Francisco General Hos-
pital include: (1) serious wounds (broken limbs, deep gashes,
or head injuries); (2) delerium tremens49 or epileptic seizures;
(3) malnutrition. Unless it is absolutely necessary to hold some-
one longer, those individuals sent to county hospital are adminis-
tered massive doses of vitamins and released within 24 hours.
Patients are not usually detained longer, because of space limita-
tions within the hospital.
The only other release procedure under the former policy
was based upon the frequent overcrowding of city jail holding fa-
cilities. When overcrowding occurred (for instance after long
holidays), there were no set criteria other than sobriety used to
determine who would and who would not be released.
Besides influencing the medical treatment of drunkenness
arrestees, the San Francisco Crime Committee apparently was in-
strumental in altering the police department release policy. Six
months after publication of its report, 50 the San Francisco Police
Department changed its departmental release policy. Besides re-
46. SAN FRANCISCO CRIME REPORT, supra note 42, at 20.
47. Id.
48. Interview with Officer John Larsen, Court Liaison, San Francisco Police
Department, in San Francisco, Aug., 1971.
49. Delirium tremens is defined as "a form of acute insanity due to alcoholic
poisoning, marked by sweating, tremor, atonic dyspepsia, restlessness, anxiety, pre-
cordial distress, mental confusion, and hallucinations." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL Dic-
TIONARY 420 (21st ed. 1961). Many of the alcoholic derelicts on skid row have
had, at one time or another, an attack of the "D.T.'s." In one sample, 46 percent
had reported at least one attack, and thirty of these had reported at least five at-
tacks. D. BOGUE, SKID Row IN AMERICAN CITIES 282 (1963).
50. SAN FRANCISCO CRIME REPORT, supra note 42, at 20.
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leasing drunkenness offenders for reasons of medical necessity or
city prison overcrowding, the new policy allowed for the release
of anyone arrested no more than twice in two weeks for public
intoxication." Recently, this policy has been revised so that those
drunks who are not taken to detoxification centers are arrested
for violation of section 647(f) and taken to district stations. All
those in obvious need of extensive medical attention are released
pursuant to section 849(b)(2) and sent to hospitals or other
health care facilities. Those without a violation of section 647(f)
within the previous 12 months likewise are released under section
849(b)(2). Those who refuse to cooperate or who have a record
of one or more recent section 647(f) arrests are detained under
the new policy. It seems that overcrowding is no longer a major
problem.2
B. Oakland
Unlike San Francisco, Oakland appears to be experiencing
significant changes in its arrest policy as well as its release and
referral policies.
1. Departmental arrest policy. The Oakland Police De-
partment bases its arrest policy primarily upon the discretion
of the individual beat patrolman. If a citizen's complaint is made,
the department often will respond by making an arrest. Other-
wise, most arrests are made if, in the officer's judgment, the indi-
vidual is unable to care for himself or is a nuisance to others. Be-
cause the beat officer is vested with considerable discretion, he
may decide not to arrest a drunk if the latter can be taken to a
nearby home of a friend or relative. It is not the policy in Oak-
land regularly to use the paddy wagon sweep procedure.53 How-
ever, as required in all Oakland arrest cases, the wagon is called
51. Interviews with Officer John Larsen, Court Liaison, San Francisco Po-
lice Department, in San Francisco, Jul.-Aug., 1970, and Aug., 1972. Authority
for the new release policy is couched in Chief of Police's General Order No. 112
(Oct. 26, 1971) which is set forth below as cited in Public Inebriate, supra note
26, at 557:
[W]hen a person is arrested by a police officer for intoxication only
and there is no complaint and no further proceedings desirable, the
Station Keeper, with the approval of the Platoon Commander, shall re-
lease such person under Section 849(b) (2) from custody at the District
Station when he is able to care for his own safety.
... The Station Keeper, prior to the release of the arrested person, shall
determine from station records the prior intoxication arrest history of
the person and if such record indicates that the arrested person has a
history of habitual records or knowledge of the officers of the station,
such person shall be held for a court hearing.
52. Interview with Officer John Larsen, Court Liaison, San Francisco Police
Department, in San Francisco, June, 1974.
53. Interviews with a captain and his staff, Oakland Police Department, in
Oakland, Jul.-Aug., 1970, and Aug., 1972.
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for transportation purposes when a beat officer does decide to
invoke the arrest process. 54
Each of the factors expressed in Nimmer's model 5 appear
to influence the arrest process in Oakland (although the lack of
a regular skid row sweep may indicate less of an emphasis on the
paternalistic and protective factors than is the case in San Fran-
cisco). The purposes of arrest appear to be similar in San Fran-
cisco and Oakland, but whereas the emphasis on arrest has re-
mained relatively stable in San Francisco, it has declined signifi-
cantly in Oakland.56
The decline is probably due to a combination of factors: di-
minishing skid row sweeps, the belief that better use of police
time can be made, and influence from civic groups to decrimi-
nalize public drunkenness.5 7 More recently, the decline in the
Oakland arrest rate may be attributed to a superior court ruling,
Crazyhawk v. Municipal Court,58 which effectively has halted the
prosecution of section 647(f) cases in Alameda County. Just as
judicial interest in the prosecution of public drunkenness cases has
diminished, there appears to be a corresponding relaxation of po-
lice efforts to arrest drunkenness offenders.
2. Departmental release/referral policy. As in San Fran-
cisco, the release/referral policy in Oakland is also undergoing
change. In 1969, the Oakland Police Department made 12,947
arrests for public drunkenness.59 Of the total, 5,247 were re-
leased under Penal Code section 849(b) (2).1 °  This figure
represents a 40.5 percent release rate. Today, however, due to
the Crazyhawk decision, virtually all section 647(f) arrestees are
either referred to a civil detoxification center or released pursuant
to section 849(b)(2). 61
54. For a more thorough description of the Oakland arrest process, see Fee-
ney & Woods, supra note 25, at 1004 et seq.
55. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
56. The Oakland Police Department made 12,947 arrests for drunkenness in
1969 and 6,401 in 1972. In 1969, this number of arrests comprised 35.6 percent
of the total Oakland misdemeanor arrest rate. In 1972, the comparable percent-
age was 23.3 percent, a significant drop, indicating that considerably less priority
is being placed upon public drunkenness arrests. Bureau of Criminal Statistics
arrest files.
57. See Bay Area Social Planning Council, The Chronic Drunkenness Of-
fender in Alameda County, Dec., 1969. See also Bay Area Social Planning Coun-
cil, Background Information On Chronic Drunkenness Offenders in Alameda
County, Aug., 1969 [hereinafter cited as Bay Area Report].
58. Civil No. 431050 (Super. Ct., Alameda County, Apr., 1973), appeal filed,
Civil No. 33522, 1st Dist., July 13, 1973, discussed infra at text accompanying
notes 156-186.
59. Bureau of Criminal Statistics arrest files.
60. Oakland Police Department arrest files.




In 1969 it was customary to release an individual who had
not violated section 647(f) within the previous six months and
who signed a form entering a plea of "guilty" to a charge of viola-
tion of that section. The entry of the guilty plea was recorded in
the court clerk's office as an "O/R Release." However, at the
recommendation of the municipal court judges, this procedure
was abandoned for unexplained "legal reasons. '"62
Subsequently, in April, 1970, the policy of the Oakland Po-
lice Department was revised, so that persons booked under Penal
Code section 647(f) and having "no prior convictions for a like
offense within six months preceding such booking, shall be re-
leased under section 849(b)(2) P.C."63  Departmental policy
also stipulated that:
Mandatory court appearances will be required for any
person 18 to 20 years of age inclusively, when charged with a
violation of 647(f) P.C. if there is a record of a like offense
having been committed within a period of six months. 64
Thus, rather than process practically every individual arrested for
public drunkenness through the courts, Oakland opted to release
virtually all first offenders as well as any other individual who was
deemed an infrequent public drunkenness offender. Further-
more, Oakland attempted to release all minors arrested for drunk-
enness unless they were considered to have a significant drinking
problem as indicated by their arrest records. 65
Today, the release/referral policy of the Oakland Police
Department has changed substantially. Since the Crazyhawk
decision the prosecution of section 647(f) cases in Alameda
County has been effectively stopped. Arrestees who are brought
into the city jail are asked by the watch-sergeant if "anyone wants
to go to the detoxification center for three days instead of being
released."66  Apparently there are enough volunteers to keep the
22-bed county detoxification center filled. Virtually all of the re-
maining individuals arrested for drunkenness are kept in custody
for a few hours to sober up and then released under the provisions
of section 849(b)(2).67
62. Interview with a judge, Oakland-Piedmont Municipal Court, in Oakland,
July, 1970.
63. Oakland Police Department Memorandum to Watch Commander, Watch
Supervisors, Central Desk Personnel and Print Room Personnel, Apr. 6, 1970, re-
vised, July, 1970 (subject: release of prisoners charged with 647(f) P.C.).
64. Id. (Emphasis in original.)
65. Interviews with a captain and his staff, Oakland Police Department, in
Oakland, Jul.-Aug., 1970.





As a practice, Oakland makes few medical referrals to the
county hospital due to space limitations. Consequently, only
those with serious medical problems (broken limbs, deep cuts,
delirium tremens) are sent to the county hospital. All other ar-
restees are administered first aid and kept in jail to await either
court appearance or the visiting doctor. Those who are admitted
to the hospital are released under section 849(b)(2). Since
there is no house doctor or steward in Oakland, the booking officer
or watch supervisor determines the medical necessity and appro-
priate alternative for each case.68
C. Los Angeles
1. Police department. Although the Los Angeles Police
Department's arrest policy changed in the late 1960's, its release
policy has remained essentially the same and a referral policy has
yet to be developed.
a. Departmental arrest policy. A 1968 Patrol Bureau
Memorandum illustrates the Los Angeles Police Department
policy for drunkenness arrests:
It is the policy of this Department that arrests for violation of
Section 647 P.C. be meaningful and limited to those circum-
stances which demand, for the welfare of the individual and/
or the public, the arrest of the intoxicated person(s). The
arrest, booking, processing, and detention of persons are ex-
pensive and time-consuming. Enforcement activity against
persons for drunkenness cannot be justified unless it is clearly
in the public interest.
It is imperative that arrests for public drunkenness be ac-
complished in strict accordance with the statutory provisions
of Section 647 P.C. This requires that the degree of influ-
ence of the intoxicating substance be such as to render the
person incapable of exercising care for his own safety or that
of others, or that because of his condition the person impedes
the free use of certain specified public ways. This may be in-
dicated by such conduct as:
1. Wandering aimlessly into the street.
2. Bumping into pedestrians using the public sidewalk.
3. Falling against windows of business establishments.
4. Lying on the street or sidewalk.
5. Obstructing pedestrians by approaching them to talk.
6. Walking against signals or disregarding vehicular
traffic.69
68. Interviews with a captain and his staff, Oakland Police Department, in
Oakland, Jul.-Aug., 1970.
69. Los Angeles Police Department Patrol Bureau Memorandum No. 3 to
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Arrest surveys taken six months before and six months after
the issuance of the memorandum by the Los Angeles Police De-
partment indicated that drunk arrests were reduced by 35.7 per-
cent.7" That memorandum indicates that police officers were
spending too much time making arrests for public intoxication.7
It may also mean that too many arrests of questionable validity
under section 647(f) were being made. Arrest rates have de-
clined since the issuance of the memorandum. 72
The Los Angeles Police Department continues, however, to
maintain a sporadic skid row sweep procedure where, contrary to
the memorandum, virtually anyone found drunk in the area is
arrested. This procedure is normally confined to the skid row
areas and takes place "when the problem becomes obvious." 73
In addition to the sweep procedure, the beat officer's discretion
in light of the memorandum and citizens' complaints comprise the
department's arrest policy. However, if it appears more reason-
able simply to escort the individual home, no arrest will be made.74
As in San Francisco and Oakland, the Los Angeles arrest
policy appears to be influenced by all three of Nimmer's arrest
influencing factors-protective, paternalistic and aesthetic. 75  It is
difficult to determine which factor may be most influential in Los
Angeles, though the 1968 memorandum outlining the depart-
ment's arrest policy suggests that the protective and paternalistic
influences are often determinative. However, because sporadic
skid row sweeps are used "when the problem becomes obvious,"
there is evidence of a strong "aesthetic" influence.
b. Deparmental release/referral policy. Little has
changed with regard to the Los Angeles Police Department's re-
Patrol Bureau Division Commanders, Feb. 23, 1968 (subject: policy on arrest of
persons for 647(f) P.C., drunk) [copy on file with the author].
70. Arrests dropped from 29,921 to 19,248 during the specified comparison
periods. Los Angeles Police Department Memorandum from Captain Ronald L.
Williamson, Commander, Central Jail Division, to Inspector Norman L. Rector,
Technical Services Bureau, Jan. 23, 1969 (subject: reduction in drunk arrests)
[copy on file with the author].
71. Interview with a booking and release sergeant, Los Angeles Police De-
partment, in Los Angeles, Aug., 1970, and Aug., 1971.
72. Los Angeles Police Department arrest totals for public drunkenness
showed 61,531 for 1969 and 55,049 for 1972. The percentage of arrests for public
intoxication to total misdemeanor arrests was 40.6 percent in 1969. This per-
centage declined to 28.5 percent in 1972. Bureau of Criminal Statistics arrest
files.
73. In this author's opinion, the sweep procedure is more accurately charac-
terized as "regular" rather than "periodic," despite indications by police officials
to the contrary in letter correspondence dated March, 1971 (copies on file with
the author).
74. Interview with a Deputy Chief, Los Angeles Police Department, in Los
Angeles, Aug., 1970.
75. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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lease policy over the past four years. In 1969 the Department
made 61,531 arrests for violations of section 647(f).76  However,
records of pre-court disposition were available for only 55,647 of
this total.77  Of the 55,647 so arrested, 11,523 were released pur-
suant to Penal Code section 849(b)(3)18 and 581 were released
pursuant to Penal Code Section 849(b)(2).79 Of the 12,104 so
released, 843 showed up in court as formerly required by section
849(b)(3). Thus, 18.3 percent of the total arrested were
treated equivalent to section 849(b)(2) releases.
In 1972, there were 55,049 section 647(f) arrests and 9,465
releases pursuant to section 849(b)(2) or 17.2 percent of the
total arrested. 0
Departmental policy for applying section 849(b)(2) or 849
(b) (3) in Los Angeles is attributed to two factors: overcrowding
in the jail and medical needs of the arrestee.81  In other words,
the only reasons for releasing an individual arrested for a section
647(f) violation prior to trial are that the jail is too crowded or
that the individual is in need of immediate medical attention, and
it is economically more feasible to release the person to a hospital
than to hospitalize him while in custody. Unless the need for
medical attention is immediate, all referrals to a county hospital
and subsequent releases are recommended by the house doctor
at the jail.
Until 1969 the Los Angeles Police Department utilized for-
mer Penal Code section 849(b)(3) to effectuate the policy de-
scribed above. Section 849(b)(3) then provided that:
(b) Any peace officer may release from custody, instead of
taking such person before a magistrate, any person arrested
76. Bureau of Criminal Statistics arrest files.
77. Los Angeles Police Department arrest files.
78. CAL. PEN. CODE § 849(b)(3) (West Supp. 1974) now provides in part:
Any peace officer may release from custody, instead of taking such per-
son before a magistrate, any person arrested without a warrant whenever:
(3) The person was arrested only for being under the influence of a
narcotic, drug, or restricted dangerous drug and such person is delivered
to a facility or hospital for treatment and no further proceedings are de-
sirable.
For former language of the statute, under which the Los Angles Police Depart-
ment operated, see text accompanying note 82 infra.
79. CAL. PEN. CODE § 849(b) (2) (West Supp. 1974) now provides in part:
Any peace officer may release from custody, instead of taking such per-
son before a magistrate, any person arrested without a warrant whenever:
(2) The person was arrested for intoxication only, and no further pro-
ceedings are desirable.
80. Bureau of Criminal Statistics arrest files.
81. Interviews with booking and release sergeants, Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment, in Los Angeles, Aug., 1970, and June, 1774.
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without a warrant whenever:
(3) The person arrested was arrested for a misdemeanor,
and has signed an agreement to appear in court or before a
magistrate at a place and time designated, as provided in this
code.8 2
Even though it is clear that section 849(b)(3) formerly required a
future court appearance, the statute was customarily applied with-
out regard to future appearances. Thus in the eyes of the police
department any man released under section 849(b)(3) was "a
fool" if he showed up in court later. The strong implication was
that no further proceedings were desirable."'
In 1969, the California Penal Code was amended, deleting
section 849(b)(3). s4  Even though procedurally the Department
changed its policy from implementing section 849(b)(3) to (b)
(2), there still exists no extensive classification scheme for releas-
ing individuals prior to trial. Other than those released for medi-
cal reasons, the only classifying that takes place occurs during
periods of overcrowding. At these times, individuals with the
fewest number of prior drunkenness arrests are released when
sober. It is the policy, however, that any individual with five or
more prior arrests within a six month period be referred to court.85
Approximately 100 individuals per day are sent to court; the rest
are released." Although a detoxification center had been sched-
uled for opening, at the time of this writing no referral policy had
been announced.
2. Sheriff's department. The Los Angeles County Sher-
iffs Department has shown a decrease in its arrest rate for public
inebriates and has substantially altered its release policy. As with
the police department, a referral policy has yet to be developed.
a. Departmental arrest policy. The Sheriff's Department
arrest policy is similar to Oakland's, in that only those who,
in an officer's discretion, are unable to care for themselves or
others, or who become a nuisance to the public are arrested.
Paddy wagons are seldom used to facilitate arrests of drunks.
Citizens' complaints are a significant cause for initiating the arrest
process. 87 As with the police department, it is difficult to isolate
an arrest influencing factor-all three of Nimmer's arrest in-
82. CAL. PEN. CODE § 849(b) (3) (West 1970), as amended, CAL. PEN. CODE§ 849(b)(3) (West Supp. 1974).
83. Interview with a deputy chief, Los Angeles Police Department, in Los
Angeles, Aug., 1970.
84. Cal. Stats. (1969), ch. 1259, § 1, at 2459.
85. Interview with a deputy chief, Los Angeles Police Department, in Los
Angeles, Aug., 1970.
86. Id.
87. Interview with an administrative assistant to the Sheriff, Los Angeles
County Sheriff's Department, in Los Angeles, Aug., 1970.
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fluencing factors88 appear to operate equally. Noteworthy, is the
fact that the Sheriff's Department has experienced a marked de-
cline in the arrest rate for drunkenness offenders in recent years.8 9
The decline apparently is attributable to a lower priority's being
placed upon the arrest of public inebriates by the Sheriffs Depart-
ment.
b. Departmental release/referral policy. Until 1971 it
had been the policy of the Los Angeles Sheriffs Department
to process virtually every individual arrested for violation of
section 647(f) through the courts. Of the 14,427 arrests for vio-
lation of -that section in 1969 by the Sheriff's Department, only
one was released pursuant to Penal Code section 849(b)(2).90
By implication, it may be assumed that further proceedings against
virtually every public drunkenness offender arrested were desired.
However, by 1972 this practice had been abandoned. 1 In that
year there were 9,402 arrests and 1,426 releases pursuant to sec-
tion 849(b)(2) yielding a 15.2 percent release rate. 2
In March 1971, a change in Departmental policy was insti-
tuted. An investigation by the Sheriffs Department culminated
in Temporary Departmental Order Number 65 which suggested
discretionary use of the section 849(b)(2) release procedure.9"
As a result, a prisoner arrested for public drunkenness could be
released under the provisions of section 849(b)(2) except when:
The safety of the prisoner or others may be jeopardized by
the release.
The prisoner is unable to care for himself.
The prisoner has an outstanding warrant(s) or there are
other holds against him.
The prisoner is under the influence of an intoxicant other
than alcohol.
The prisoner fails to exhibit his Driver's License or other
satisfactory evidence of his identity.
The prisoner demands an immediate appearance before a
magistrate.
88. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
89. The total number of section 647(f) arrests by the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department included 14,427 for 1969 and 9,402 for 1972. The figure
for 1969 comprised 31.6 percent of total misdemeanor arrests made by the Sher-
iff's Department. In 1972 this percentage dropped to 13.5 percent. Bureau of
Criminal Statistics arrest files.
90. Bureau of Criminal Statistics arrest files. Sheriff's Department arrest
files for 1969 showed only 13,426 arrests for violation of section 647(f). How-
ever, both State and Departmental statistics showed only one release for 1969.
91. Interview with an administrative assistant to the Sheriff, Los Angeles
County Sheriff's Department, in Los Angeles, Aug., 1974.
92. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department arrest files.
93. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Temporary Departmental Or-
der, TDO No. 65, Mar. 12, 1971.
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A court has ordered that specified persons or crimes shall not
be released within that court's jurisdiction.
The prisoner was arrested by another agency and that agency
has not authorized such release.
The prisoner has been arrested for Disorderly Conduct Drunk
within the previous six months as determined by a check of
the Station's Arrest Records.94
During a trial period for the new policy, from March to June
1971, 3,363 arrests were made for public drunkenness and 156,
or 4.6 percent, were released pursuant to section 849(b)(2). As
indicated above, in 1972, the release percentage increased to 15.2.
During the 1971 trial period, another 1,413 arrestees, or 42 per-
cent, were processed pursuant ,to California Penal Code section
853.6 which provides that a misdemeanor defendant be issued a
notice to appear in court and be released from custody.95 Of
those released pursuant to section 853.6, 271 or 19.2 percent
failed later to appear in court as they had promised.9" The rela-
tively extensive use of citation releases for drunkenness offenders
by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department is a result of the
Sheriff's Department policy of reviewing all misdemeanor arrests
for possible citation release as required by the statute.9 7
The Sheriffs Department was scheduled to share with the
Police Department the detoxification center planned for opening
in July, 1974; however, as with the Police Department, no referral
policy had been announced at the time of this writing.
D. San Diego
Police and sheriff's departments. Although the arrest rate
for the Police Department has not changed significantly over 'the
94. The Temporary Order has since been permanently incorporated into the
Sheriff's Department Policies and Procedure Manual as section 5-03/103.00 et
seq. Interview with an administrative assistant to the Sheriff, Los Angeles
County Sheriff's Department, in Los Angeles, Aug., 1974.
95. CAL. PEN. CODE § 853.6 (West Supp. 1974).
96. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department arrest files.
97. Interview with an administrative assistant to the Sheriff, Los Angeles
County Sheriff's Department, in Los Angeles, Aug., 1974. See CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 853.6 (West Supp. 1974). In this author's opinion, the citation release proce-
dure is more appropriate for use in misdemeanor cases other than public intoxica-
tion. Normally the statute is used to release a misdemeanor arrestee from the
field or stationhouse while preserving the right to prosecute. This enables some-
one arrested for a minor offense to be free pending a later court appearance. To
employ this procedure in public intoxication cases results in an individual's being
arrested, sobered up, and then released with instructions to appear in court at a
later date. It is doubtful that any police or court time is saved. Moreover, if
the purpose of the arrest/release procedure in public intoxication cases is merely
to sober up the inebriate, then appearance in court at a subsequent date seems
unnecessary. See generally Feeney, Citation in Lieu of Arrest: The New Cali-
fornia Law, 25 VAND. L. REV. 367 (1972).
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four year period studied, the arrest rate of the Sheriffs Depart-
ment has shown a definite decline. Additionally, although the re-
lease policies of both agencies have not been altered, the number
of individuals now being released is greater for both agencies. Re-
ferral policies are beginning to develop.
a. Departmental arrest policy. Neither the Police nor the
Sheriff's Department relies upon the regular service of its paddy
wagons to initiate the process for arresting drunks. Both agencies
utilize citizens' complaints and the discretion of their own officers
in making the decision whether to arrest. Normally an officer's
judgment is based upon an evaluation of the suspect's ability to
care for himself and the likelihood he may be a nuisance or dan-
ger to others. The major difference between the policies of the
two departments is in the type of drunkenness offender each de-
partment consistently arrests. The Police Department is con-
fronted more frequently with the regular "down-and-out"-the
gutter and alley dweller. On the other hand, the Sheriff's De-
partment comes in contact with a more transient type of drunk
-one who is found in the rural area and is often "just passing
through.""8 Additionally, both agencies appear to respond equally
to protective, paternalistic and aesthetic influences in making
the arrest decision. 99 While the drunk arrest rate for the Po-
lice Department has remained relatively stable, the rate for the
Sheriffs Department has declined significantly. 100  The decline
may be explained in part by the lower priority the Sheriff's De-
partment has attached to drunk arrests and the Department's cor-
responding diminishing use of the paddy wagon.
b. Departmental release/referral policy. Both depart-
ments have followed similar release policies for drunkenness
arrestees, and both are releasing more individuals than ever
before. The Police Department, however, tends to release more
individuals than the Sheriff's Department. In 1969 the San Diego
Police Department released 28.5 percent of their 8,063 drunken-
ness arrests for that year. 101 At the same time the San Diego
98. Interviews with Police and Sheriff's Department officials, San Diego Po-
lice Department and San Diego County Sheriff's Department, in San Diego, Aug.,
1970.
99. Id. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
100. The Police Department drunkenness arrest totals for section 647(f) viola-
tions show 8,063 arrests in 1969 and 7,940 in 1972, or 35.5 percent of all misde-
meanor arrests by the Police Department in 1969 and 31.5 percent of all misde-
meanor arrests in 1972. Interestingly enough, the Sheriff's Department made
more actual arrests for drunkenness in 1972 than in 1969 (631 in 1969 and 740
in 1972), but the percentage of all misdemeanor arrests was considerably less in
1972 than in 1969 (8.2 percent in 1972 but 26.0 percent in 1969). Bureau of




Sheriffs Department made 631 arrests for violation of section
647(f) and released 2.2 percent pursuant to section 849(b)
(2).1 °2 However, in June of 1970, the Police Department, Sher-
iff's Department and the California Highway Patrol consolidated
their booking and jailing facilities into the San Diego County Jail.
As a result, for the year 1972, the Police Department made
7,940 arrests of which 4,145 were released for a release percent-
age of 52.1.1°3 In the same year the Sheriff's office made 740
arrests for violation of section 647(f) and released 182 or 24.6
percent. 10 4
The policy of both departments for the release of drunken-
ness arrestees under section 849(b)(2) requires that all persons
who are arrested solely for intoxication be considered for a release
except when one or more of the following conditions are present:
1. The person has been arrested for being drunk three or
more ,times within twelve months. (The County requires
that an individual be arrested only two or more times
within twelve months.)
2. The safety of the prisoner, or of others, may be jeopar-
dized by the release.
3. The prisoner is unable to care for himself.
4. The arrest was on a warrant or the prisoner has been ar-
raigned on the charge.
5. The ranking officer on duty in the jail believes, for good
cause, that the prisoner should not be released. 105
Additionally, some individuals are released pursuant to sec-
tion 849(b)(2) if medical necessity so dictates. Rather than re-
quire an officer to transport the injured offender -to a county hos-
pital, guard him until he recovers, and return him to jail for court
processing, the individual is merely transported to the hospital and
released pursuant to section 849(b)(2). However, since the
county jail facility has its own medical dispensary with a house
doctor and nurse, few cases require the aid of outside assistance.
Normally, only those cases that necessitate constant medical sur-
veillance (those who are hallucinating or experiencing blackouts),
or that require special medical equipment (such as X-ray or intra-
venous feeding apparatus) will be referred to the San Diego




105. San Diego Police Department Instructions No. 9 (May 27, 1970), No.
91 (Mar. 9, 1970) [copies on file with the author] [hereinafter cited as San
Diego Instructions]. A lieutenant on the San Diego County Sheriff's Depart-
ment confirmed that this was that department's policy as well. Interview with
a lieutenant, San Diego County Sheriff's Department, in San Diego, Aug., 1970.
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made by the doctor or nurse on duty.106
The supervising officers screen section 647(f) violators
booked for jailing and not referred to a medical facility, and re-
lease them when the prisoners meet their release criteria, unless
the booking form filled out by the submitting agency carries a no-
tation of "no O/R release" or "DNR" (Do Not Release) in the
"remarks" section of the form. Differences in release percent-
ages for the Police and Sheriffs Department can be attributed to
the somewhat more stringent Sheriff's Department requirement of
no more than two prior section 647(f) arrests during the past
year, as compared with the Police Department's three priors, and
the more prevalent use of "DNR" by the Sheriff's Department."°7
Additionally, part of the difference may be explained by a
secondary screening that the County Sheriffs Department em-
ploys. The ranking officer on duty in the jail reviews all candi-
dates for release according to information provided him by the
booking form. If the first four policy exceptions' 08 do not apply
and there is no "DNR" listed, then he considers the following fac-
tors in determining whether, "for good cause," the prisoner should
not be released:
1. The amount of time an individual has lived at a particu-
lar address.
2. The amount of time an individual has lived in California.
3. Whether the defendant is married, single, or divorced.
4. The individual's length of employment.
5. The number and ages of the defendant's dependents. 10 9
Thus in the Sheriff's Department, socio-economic as well as
prior arrest criteria are utilized in deciding whether or not to re-
lease. However, there exists no formal classification of responses
to the questions posed above. Consequently, it is completely
within the discretion of the ranking officer to make the final re-
lease decision.
There is an operating detoxification center in San Diego at
this time, and it is within the patrolman's discretion whether to
escort a drunk to "de-tox" or to arrest him. Although there exists
106. Interview with a lieutenant, San Diego County Sheriff's Department, in
San Diego, Aug., 1970.
107. Interviews with officers, San Diego County Sheriff's Department, in San
Diego, Aug., 1970, and June, 1974.
108. See text accompanying note 105 supra.
109. San Diego Instructions, supra note 105. The socio-economic characteris-
tics that San Diego uses for section 849(b) (2) releases are much less formal than
those normally employed for a section 853.6 (citation-misdemeanor) release.
See CAL. PEN. CODE § 853.6 (West 1970). Nevertheless, these subjective criteria
are significant in establishing the "good cause" requirements for section 849(b)
(2) releases under Department policy.
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no formal agency guidelines for referral, the more cooperative a
drunk is, the more likely he will be taken to "detox," or if he
is arrested, the more likely he will be released under section 849
(b) (2).11°
E. Fresno
Police and sheriff's department. Although policies in Fresno
have not formally changed, arrest rates have declined slightly
while release rates have increased for both the Police and Sheriff's
Departments.
a. Departmental arrest policy. Although the Police De-
partment occasionally has used the paddy wagon to assist in mak-
ing arrests of drunkenness offenders, it does not generally use the
wagon to conduct regular sweeps of the skid row sections of town.
Similarly, the Sheriffs Department will use the wagon only in
particular cases. As in other departments, an officer's discretion
to make an arrest for public intoxication is based upon an evalua-
tion of the ability of the drunk to care for himself. If an arrest
can be avoided merely by escorting the individual to his home,
then the officer will do so. The only other frequent source initiat-
ing the drunkenness arrest process in Fresno is citizens' com-
plaints.' Accordingly, all three factors observed by Nimmer are
influential in the Fresno arrest process,"12, and no single factor
stands out above the others. Arrest rates for both agencies have
declined, probably because of thq lower priority that is being
placed upon the arrest of drunkenness offenders by the Police and
Sheriff's Departments."' Although both departments have regis-
tered declines in arrest rates for public intoxication, Fresno main-
tains one of the highest percentage of drunkenness to total misde-
meanor arrests of any city in California. From personal observ-
ations and discussions with police personnel, it appears to this au-
thor that the high percentage of drunkenness arrests is due to a
substantial skid row population, comprised of many transients and
seasonal workers who come to Fresno to work the fields of the
fertile San Joaquin Valley."14
110. Interview with officers, San Diego County Sheriff's Department, in San
Diego, June, 1974.
111. Interview with a sergeant and lieutenant, Fresno County Sheriff's Depart-
ment, and with a captain, Fresno Police Department, in Fresno, Aug., 1970.
112. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
113. Police Department drunkenness arrest totals were 15,547 in 1969 and
12,942 in 1972. The comparative percentage with total misdemeanor arrests for
the Police Department was 84.1 percent in 1969 and 71.2 percent in 1972. The
Sheriff's Department showed 1,307 drunk arrests for 1969 and 1,144 arrests for
1972. Comparative percentages for the Sheriff's Department were 44.1 percent
in 1969 and 32.8 percent in 1972. Bureau of Criminal Statistics arrest files.
114. Many field workers are so dependent upon "a bottle" that police reported
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b. Departmental release/referral policy. For both agen-
cies, the 1974 release policy is similar to that of 1969; however,
the release rate has increased significantly for the Police De-
partment, whereas it has decreased for the Sheriff's Depart-
ment.115
In 1969, the policy of the Fresno Police and Sheriff's Depart-
ments in determining when "no further proceedings are desira-
ble" was to release all those arrested for three or fewer violations
of section 647(0 in one month, in the absence of unusual circum-
stances. Currently, a person must not have been arrested more
than twice in one month in order to be released. Additionally,
if extenuating circumstances are present (for instance, violence
on the part of the drunk), then the arresting officer may request
that the defendant be "booked hot" and be detained for court ap-
pearance.
Fresno does have a small detoxification facility in present op-
eration. Each morning a hospital representative visits the jail and
takes those drunks deemed in need of detoxification to the "de-
tox" center. Those who are escorted to the center are not report-
ed as section 647 (f) arrestees. 11
Summary
All California police agencies observed have been influenced
to some extent by the factors-protective, paternalistic and aes-
thetic-that Nimmer described." 7  However, it is difficult to de-
termine which of these factors has had the most influence on a
particular police agency's arrest policy. These policies generally
reflect a rather strict adherence -to the dictates of Penal Code sec-
tion 647(f), which may suggest why Nimmer's factors have rela-
tively equal influence on the decision to arrest. When strict ad-
herence to section 647(f) is not followed (for example, during
instances where employers would make the skid row rounds in the morning entic-
ing men to come aboard a labor bus for a bottle. When the day in the fields
was over the men would be returned to the skid row area and given another bottle
along with their wages (after deductions were made for the price of the alcohol).
Interview with a patrol officer, Fresno Police Department, in Fresno, Aug.,
1970.
115. In 1969, the Fresno Police Department made a total of 15,547 arrests for
violation of section 647(f). Of this number 44.6 percent were released pursuant
to Penal Code section 849(b)(2). In 1972 there were 6,795 or 52.5 percent re-
leased, and 12,942 total arrests. In 1969 the Fresno County Sheriff's Department
conducted an additional 1,307 drunkenness arrests. Of those arrested by the Sher-
iff's Department, 420 or 32.1 percent were released pursuant to section 849(b) (2).
In 1972 there were 145 or 12.7 percent released, and 1,144 arrests. Bureau of
Criminal Statistics arrest files.
116. Interviews with various personnel, Fresno County Sheriff's Department,
in Fresno, Aug., 1970, July, 1971, and June, 1974.
117. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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skid row sweeps) some factors appear to be more influential than
others (protective and paternalistic in San Francisco, aesthetic in
Los Angeles).
In addition, the jurisdictions observed evidence a decline in
the number of public drunkenness arrests being made. Between
1969 and 1972 only the San Diego Sheriff's Department reported
a slight increase in its arrest rate. In like manner, the number
of drunkenness arrests compared to total misdemeanor arrests has
declined," 8 as California police agencies place lower priority upon
the arrest of public inebriates.
Finally, the police observed in this study seem to be placing
a lower priority upon the processing of drunkenness offenders
through court. This trend is evident from the general increase
in the use of dispositional alternatives pursuant to sections 849
(b)(2) and 647(ff)." 9  Many of the reasons thought to be
responsible for the increased use of section 849(b)(2) are ex-
hibited in the cities visited. Still, police policies and practices
continue to indicate that there exists among the various cities a
substantially inconsistent interpretation of section 849(b)(2).
For example, there is little or no uniformity in determining when
"no further proceedings are desirable." An individual detained
for court appearance in one city may be unhesitatingly released
in another. Conversely, some individuals against whom "no fur-
ther proceedings are desirable" in one jurisdiction are the very
ones subjected to the complete judicial process elsewhere. In still
other jurisdictions, virtually everyone arrested for public drunken-
ness must appear in court, regardless of the circumstances. Simi-
larly, a lack of uniform implementation of section 647(ff) refer-
rals prevails among the five jurisdictions studied. 20 This lack of
uniformity prompts further discussion.
WHY No UNIFORM POLICY ExISTS
The prevailing policies and practices of California local law
enforcement agencies reflect the reality that these agencies pos-
sess virtually total discretion in determining who should and who
should not be released pursuant to sections 849(b)(2) and 647
(ff) of the Penal Code. By statute the only limitations upon a
police agency employing section 849(b) are that: (1) the person
arrested is not arrested by warrant, and (2) the person arrested
is arrested for intoxication only, and no further proceedings are
desirable. 12  Conspicuously absent are guidelines for the appica-
118. See Table I in Appendix infra.
119. See Table II in Appendix infra.
120. See Table III in Appendix infra.
121. CAL. PEN. CODE § 849(b) (West Supp. 1974).
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tion of section 849(b) (2), even though a large class of arrestees
potentially fall within the release statute. As a result, the phrase
"no further proceedings are desirable" leaves police with an op-
tion but no standards for its exercise.
Similarly, the only limitations upon a police department's
utilization of section 647(ff) is that the subdivision shall not
apply to:
(1) Any person who is under the influence of any drug, or
under the combined influence of intoxicating liquor and
any drug.
(2) Any person who a peace officer has probable cause to
believe has committed any felony, or who has committed
any misdemeanor in addition to subdivision (f) of this
section.
(3) Any person who a peace officer in good faith believes
will attempt escape or will be unreasonably difficult for
medical personnel to control.122
Otherwise, if he is reasonably able to do so, a peace officer
shall place the person or cause him to be placed, in civil protective
custody. 2 ' No statutory guidelines are provided to aid the officer
in determining whether he is reasonably able to place the inebri-
ate in civil protective custody. Such broad discretion permits a
police agency to act as a screening mechanism equivalent to a
municipal court when deciding who should and who should not
be released, referred to a detoxification center, or be subject to
the traditional judicial process.
Lack of standards for police officers is but one of the anoma-
lies of the current state of the law regarding public intoxication.
Divergent policies in the municipal court sentencing structure
similarly fail to notify police of judicial objectives in processing
public inebriates. While some courts employ careful classification
procedures and screening mechanisms in recommending a variety
of sentences deemed to be appropriate for the needs of particular
types of individuals, others treat virtually every person with a
drinking problem alike. In the absence of legislative or judicial
guidelines, police departments have understandably developed re-
lease/referral policies consonant with their own philosophies and
the practical realities of law enforcement. In this regard, the most
prevalent response by police in explaining the use of a release
policy is "necessity":12 4 necessity generated by overcrowded jails
122. Id. § 647(ff).
123. Id.
124. Interview with a sergeant, Fresno County Sheriff's Department, in Fresno,




as well as by overburdened courtrooms. Without a method for
relieving the pressure on both the jail and the court created by
the sheer volume of drunkenness offenders processed, the system
would encounter serious problems. Either far fewer intoxicated
individuals would have to be arrested or new additions to the jail
facilities and staff would be needed.
Moreover, if drunkenness arrests were curtailed because of
overcrowded conditions in the jails and courtrooms, officials fear
that additional problems would be created on the street. For in-
stance, some officials believe that a significant number of habitual
drunkenness offenders surely would die if they were deprived of
even the short, forced dry-out afforded by an overnight incarcera-
tion and a free meal. 125 Furthermore, police almost certainly
would encounter repercussions from merchants and citizens if
"those drunks weren't taken off the street. ' 126  Finally, the num-
ber of reported injuries to helpless, meandering drunks, who stag-
ger in front of moving traffic or injure ,themselves in sidewalk falls
would probably increase.' 27 Thus, police view section 849(b)
(2) as necessary for maintaining a proper balance between the
purposes of the arrest process in public intoxication cases and the
capabilities of the system to handle the volume of such arrests.
The concept of "necessity" helps to explain the wide dispar-
ity in the methods of implementing section 849(b)(2). Where
it is necessary for one department to seek dispositional alternatives
to the arrest-prosecution process, it may not be necessary for an-
other department to do so. For example, while it may be neces-
sary for the Los Angeles Police Department to relieve conditions
of overcrowding, the Sheriff's Department may have no such prob-
lem because that department, which runs the county jail system, 12 s
has the capacity to handle the large volume of drunkenness ar-
rests.
"Necessity," however, does not entirely explain the wide var-
125. Interview with a Fresno County Roads Department employee who was
supervising road work of drunkenness offenders, near Fresno, July, 1971. This
opinion was shared by officers of the Fresno Police and Sheriff's Departments,
whom this author interviewed in Fresno, Aug., 1970, and July, 1971, as well as
by Officer John Larsen, Court Liaison, San Francisco Police Department, inter-
viewed in San Francisco during July and Aug., 1970. Additionally, in interviews
with Fresno Municipal Court judges in Fresno, during July and Aug., 1970, the
same opinion was expressed.
126. Interviews with Officer John Larsen, Court Liaison, San Francisco Police
Department, in San Francisco, Jul.-Aug., 1970.
127. Id.
128. In a correspondence with Sheriff Pitchess of Los Angeles County, in
Apr., 1971, it was reported that "[t]his jail system is the fifth largest penal sys-
tem in the United States and maintains an average daily population in excess of
10,000." The Inmate Reception Center processes between 2,200 and 2,500 in-
mates per day. (Copy of the letter on file with the author.)
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iation in release policies. Under some departmental policies re-,
leases are effected even when, in terms of system capabilities,
they are not necessary. Although the Los Angeles Sheriff's De-
partment, for example, generally has not found it "necessary" to
release drunkenness offenders, in recent years a release policy has
been implemented. Thus, a complex interaction of other factors
is involved in the decision whether to release. These include:
an equity factor-whether a legitimate purpose will be served by
processing an individual arrested for public intoxication through
court; a judicial factor-the judicial influence upon police either
to prosecute or release drunkenness arrestees; an administrative
factor-the benefits in terms of time and economy to police and
courts derived from a decision not to proceed with prosecution;
a community factor-civic pressure upon police to seek disposi-
tional alternatives to prosecution in drunkenness cases, and a
legislative factor-legislative influence upon police to seek dis-
position of detoxification centers under section 647(ff).
Although definite policies under section 647(ff) are just be-
ginning to emerge, it is already apparent that a lack of uniform
implementation similar to that respecting section 849(b) (2) has
developed. One reason for this absence of uniformity is the am-
biguous statutory phrase, "if he [the peace officer] is reasonably
able to do so." Interestingly enough, however, referral policies
generally do not appear to be influenced by this phrase. Instead,
the decision whether to refer is based on a preliminary administra-
tive determination of the benefit likely to accrue to the particular
individual from detoxification referral, even though the statutory
language concerning referral appears to be mandatory: "a peace
officer shall place the person, or cause him to be placed, in civil
protective custody."12 This concept of individual need varies from
city to city. Thus, for example, San Francisco police refer only
those picked up during certain skid row sweeps; Oakland police
refer only those who volunteer; San Diego police and sheriffs de-
partments refer only individuals who the officer believes would
benefit from such treatment; and Fresno police and sheriff's de-
partments refer only people who a hospital representative believes
are in need of such treatment.
Despite this lack of uniformity in implementation, however,
California Penal Code sections 849(b)(2) and 647(ff) provide
police with a means to accomplish the purposes of arrest in public
intoxication cases while helping to relieve the criminal justice sys-
tem of the burdens created by such arrests. Accordingly, these
sections enable police to meet both the needs of the system and
129. CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(ff) (West Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
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the needs of the individual. The remainder of this article ex-
plores some of the legal issues raised by the present day imple-
mentation of these sections. Thereafter, a method of classifica-
tion and some legislative amendments are suggested so that sec-
tions 849(b) (2) and 647(ff) can be utilized in a more uniform
and effective manner.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PENAL CODE SECTIONS
849(b)(2) AND 647 (ff) 130
In this author's opinion, both Penal Code sections 849(b)
(2) and 647(ff) provide a constitutional means for dealing with
public inebriates in California."3 ' As yet there has been little
commentary regarding the constitutionality of section 849(b)(2).
However, by analyzing the cases arising under section 647 (f)
some comments can be made about section 849(b)(2).
Penal Code Section 647(ff)
The constitutionality of section 647(ff) 13 2 must be examined
in two factual contexts: situations where a detoxification program
has been adopted by a county and situations where no such pro-
gram exists. In both of these contexts the potential effect of sec-
tion 647(ff) is to make simple violations 38 of section 647(f) non-
criminal. Accordingly, the argument goes, to treat some drunk-
enness offenders as criminals while treating others civilly is a de-
nial of equal protection.
The first case to deal with the constitutionality of section
647(ff) in the context of the absence of a detoxification program
was People v. Superior Court. 34  Defendant Carmelo Colon, the
real party in interest, was arrested for being in a public place un-
der the influence of intoxicating liquor. 3 5  During booking, am-
130. Although implicit in this discussion is the constitutionality of section 647
(f), this question will not be addressed per se, since to do so would raise addi-
tional issues which were previously touched upon (see note 12 supra) and which
are not the critical issues presently being examined by the courts. Such issues
include whether it is unconstitutional (cruel and unusual punishment) to subject
a chronic alcoholic to the criminal process, and whether a given statute is uncon-
stitutionally vague.
131. See Public Inebriate, supra note 26, at 552-56 for a contrary analysis.
132. The issue is more properly defined as the constitutionality of section 647
(f) or section 647 in light of the enactment of section 647(ff). However, in or-
der to distinguish cases dealing with other issues necessarily raised in analyzing
section 647(f) (see, e.g., note 130 supra), this author prefers to characterize this
discussion as an investigation only into the constitutionality of section 647(ff).
133. Simple violations of section 647(f) are those which-do not involve any
of the three numbered exceptions to section 647(ff).
134. 29 Cal. App. 3d 397, 105 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1972).
135. CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(f) (West Supp. 1974).
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phetamine pills were found and seized by the police. At his
subsequent prosecution for possession of restricted dangerous
drugs,' Colon's motion to suppress the seized evidence was
granted. The trial court found that Penal Code section 647 was
unconstitutional, in that it provided for civil confinement only
where appropriate facilities were available, thus making the im-
position of criminal sanctions dependent on the place where the
offense was committed. Accordingly, the lower court held that
the arrest, booking, and search incident to the arrest were illegal.
Subsequently the People petitioned the court of appeal for
a writ of mandate commanding that the trial court set aside its
order granting the motion to suppress. The appellate court held
that a person arrested for disorderly conduct for being in a public
place under the influence of intoxicating liquor has no fundamen-
tal right to be treated in exactly the same manner in each county,
and that the state interest in finding a more effective way to deal
with inebriates qualifies as a rational basis for allowing counties
the option of experimenting in the development of various ap-
proaches to the problem of alcoholism. 3 7  Thus, the statute did
not violate equal protection. In supporting its decision the court
observed:
The state, in enacting Penal Code section 647, subdivi-
sion (ff), is attempting to deal with the problem of inebriates
by permitting any county which wishes to participate in the
program an opportunity -to deal with such people as "sick"
rather than as criminals. The United States Supreme Court
has upheld state's action whereby individuals are treated dif-
ferently in different counties. [Citations omitted.]" The state
is not bound "to strike at all evils at the same time or in the
same way." Semler v. Oregon Dental Examiners, 294 U.S.
608, 610. Consequently, the different treatment in different
counties does not necessarily constitute a violation of equal
protection. A state must be allowed to experiment within
its borders to determine what is the best way to deal with the
problem of inebriates. 138
Defendant Colon cited Serrano v. Priest 9 for the proposition
that the state had violated his constitutional rights by failing to pro-
vide equal treatment facilities to all public inebriates statewide. 140
The court distinguished the case before it from Serrano by noting
that in Serrano the Supreme Court "emphasized the fact that it
was dealing with a fundamental right, education, and would there-
136. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11910 (West 1964).
137. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 401, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
138. Id. at 400, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
139. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
140. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 401, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
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fore require a compelling interest of the state to justify a law creat-
ing inequality."'' The Court of Appeal found no such funda-
mental right in Colon:
In the case at hand, we do not deem it to be a funda-
mental right of a person arrested for disorderly conduct for
being in a public place under the influence of intoxicating
liquor to be treated for his drinking problem in identically the
same manner in each county. If there is no fundamental
right involved, any rational basis will uphold the statute.
The state interest in finding a more effective way to deal with
inebriates qualifies as a rational basis for allowing counties
the option of experimenting in their effort to develop a more
enlightened and scientific approach to the problem of alco-
holism. [Citation omitted.]' 42
Because it could be argued that Colon turned on the search
and seizure issue rather than on the constitutionality of different
treatment in different counties,'48 the Court of Appeal for the
Second District decided another case five months after Colon,
which again challenged the constitutionality of section 647(ff) in
the same factual context, that is, the absence of a local detoxifica-
tion program. In People v. McNaught, 44 police found the de-
fendant drunk, staggering and ready to fall against the side of a
liquor store, and arrested him for violation of Penal Code section
647 (f). Subsequently, the defendant pleaded guilty and was sen-
tenced to serve a term of six months in the county jail. Execution
of the sentence was suspended and the defendant was placed on
summary probation for three months. One month later, the de-
fendant was found, again drunk, on -the front lawn of a local resi-
dent. He was arrested again for violation of section 647(0 and
again pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to serve six months in
the county jail. With respect to the earlier charge, probation was
revoked and the sentence was ordered executed, to be served con-
currently with the sentence on the second charge.
On appeal the defendant argued that the effect of section
647(ff) is to render simple violations of section 647(0 non-crim-
inal in counties which operate detoxification centers. Since the
141. Id. at 401, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
142. Id.
143. The court stated.
[i]f we were to decide that the police officer should have taken Colon
to a 72-hour facility (or since there is none in Monterey County, to the
general hospital, as Colon contends), would the search of Colon have
been permissible notwithstanding the fact that he would have been only
in civil protective custody?
Id. at 402, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 698. The court then found reason to believe that
the search would be justified. Id.
144. 31 Cal. App. 3d 599, 107 Cal. Rptr. 566 (1973).
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county in which the defendant was arrested did not operate such
a center, to treat him as a criminal for a condition which in coun-
ties having a detoxification center would cause him to become only
a patient, unconstitutionally discriminated against him on the for-
tuitous basis that he happened to be arrested in a county lacking
a center. Accordingly, he argued, he was denied equal protection
of the law.'45
Initially, the court found further support for the proposition
acknowledged in Colon, that a lack of territorial uniformity does
not necessarily deny equal protection. In addition to Salsburg v.
Maryland,4 ' which was relied upon by the Colon court, the Mc-
Naught'47 court cited McGowan v. Maryland,4 8 which upheld
Maryland's statutes permitting the Sunday sale of certain mer-
chandise in Anne Arundel County, while prohibiting it in others.
In pertinent part, the United States Supreme Court there stated:
But we have held that the Equal Protection Clause relates to
equality between areas and that territorial uniformity is not a
constitutional prerequisite. With particular reference to the
State of Maryland, we have noted that the prescription of dif-
ferent substantive offenses in different counties is generally a
matter for legislative discretion. We find no invidious dis-
crimination here.' 49
After reviewing the historical setting of section 647(ff), the
court in McNaught concluded:
It was obviously the intent of the Legislature that the exist-
ence of such a center should not be forced on counties, but
that it should be up to the responsible local authorities to
determine whether local conditions call for its establishment
and maintenance.150
In relying on Serrano v. Priest,'5' the defendant argued that
he was denied equal protection because the existence of a detox-
ification center depends on the financial ability of the county to
pay for its establishment and maintenance, and classifications
based on wealtlh are suspect.' 52  Rejecting this argument, the
court noted that as far as it knew, the community did not have
a detoxification center "for the precise reasons which, under the
statutory scheme, may move the county authorities to decide not
to operate one. 1 5 3
145. Id. at 602, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 567-68.
146. 346 U.S. 545 (1954).
147. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 604, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
148. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
149. Id. at 427.
150. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 607, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
151. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
152. Id. at 597, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
153. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 608, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 572. In this regard, the court
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The courts of appeal in both Colon and McNaught dealt with
situations in which a detoxification program had not been adopted
by the community. The more difficult question arises in analyz-
ing the constitutional implications of whether a simple violation
of Penal Code section 647(f) may subject the offender to the
criminal process in a county where a detoxification center exists.
As the court in McNaught noted,
In view of the conclusion we have reached, we do not
find it necessary to decide the correctness of defendant's
premise that a simple violation of section 647, subdivision
(f), does not constitute a crime in a county operating a de-
toxification center.' 5
4
Reasonble men may well differ on that point. Without
discussing it further, it is apparent that most of the difficul-
ties are caused by the phrase "if he is reasonably able to do
so," which qualifies the officer's duty to place the inebriate
in civil protective custody. The problem is that section 647,
subdivision (ff), does not specify what factors may be taken
into consideration in determining the officer's reasonable
ability to place the inebriate in civil protective custody.' 55
Thus far, there has been only one decision which has treated
the legal implications of subjecting a drunkenness offender to the
listed the following factors as being relevant to county authorities in deciding
whether or not to operate a detoxification center:
1. Geographic Factors: (Size of county in area and population;
population distribution by towns versus county; number of locations
needed).
2. Demographic Factors: (Stability of size of population; median
age, etc.).
3. Socioeconomic Factors: (Median income; drinking habits (pub-
lic vs. private); incidence of unemployment and other stress-producing
conditions; problems peculiar to particular ethnic minorities).
4. Financial Factors: (Impact of problem drinking on other
county services and facilities (hospitals, law enforcement, courts, jail,
welfare agencies)).
5. Law Enforcement Factors: (Specific impact of problem drink-
ing on crime as a causative or related factor; types of crimes (violent
or victimless); projections for future).
6. Health Factors: (Specific impact of problem drinking or physi-
cal and mental health problems as a causative or related factor; projec-
tions for future).
7. Existing Public and Private Services for Problem Drinkers:(Hospitals, clinics, A.A.).
8. Results of Present Handling of Problem of Inebriation in Crim-
inal Context: (Police efficiency and humaneness; sentencing habits of
local judiciary; recidivism, etc.).
9. Projected Results From Detoxification Centers: (Expert opin-
ions, interpretation of data from similar projects).
10. Availability of Resources to Establish and Operate: (A. Cost,
staffing, community support. B. Backup services. C. Follow-up serv-
ices).
Id. at 607 n.10, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 571 n.10.
154. Id. at 568, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 602-03.
155. Id. n.3, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 603 n.3,
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criminal process in a county operating a detoxification center.
The court in Crazyhawk v. Municipal Court'56 distinguished the
case before it from Colon because of the existence of facilities
in Alameda County for referrals pursuant to section 647(ff).
The fact that such facilities might not be adequate to handle the
number of persons who would otherwise qualify, did not, in the
court's opinion, justify the continued arrest-prosecution practice
with regard to those who cannot be handled through civil detoxi-
fication:
The legal incongruity of the question of whether or not
an inebriate is to be treated as a criminal or as a sick person
having to turn on the existence or nonexistence of an empty
bed is manifest. The very essence of the doctrine of equal
protection is to obviate such unequal treatment of persons
within the same category. To otherwise construe P.C. 647(ff) would be to find in it a fatal constitutional defect.' 57
Accordingly, the court issued a writ of prohibition preventing
prosecution of Crazyhawk. This writ effectively stopped all crim-
inal prosecutions of drunkenness offenders in Alameda County.
The superior court resolved the equal protection issue by holding
that all persons arrested for simple violation of section 647(f) in
Alameda County must be placed in some form of civil protective
custody:
3. Civil protective custody occurs on the detention of the
inebriate for an alleged violation of section 647(f) and
continues thereafter until the process of evaluation and
placement of the person is completed. Placement during
civil protective custody shall be for evaluation and treat-
ment pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section
5170.
4. Where there are no beds available at an evaluation and
treatment facility, the interim police practice of maintain-
ing an inebriate in civil protective custody is proper and
is approved.
5. No person shall be released so long as he is a danger to
others or to himself, or gravely disabled due to chronic
alcoholism, without consideration of whether or not he
should be certified for extensive treatment. In all other
cases, he shall be detained no longer than 72 hours. 158
Regardless of the possible social desirability of treating ev-
eryone arrested for a simple violation of section 647(f) in civil
protective custody, it is submitted that the lower court in Crazy-
156. Civil No. 431050 (Super. Ct., Alameda County, Apr. 13, 1973), appealfiled, Civil No. 33522, Ist Dist., July 13, 1973.
157. Id., Memorandum Decision, at 2 (Jan. 29, 1973).
158. Id., Conclusions of Law, at 2.
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hawk erred by determining that all defendants not so treated in
counties where such facilities exist are denied equal protection of
the law.
It is frequently stated that a classification is valid if it includes
"all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose
of the law."' 15 9 However, "equal protection decisions recognize
that a state cannot function without classifying its citizens for vari-
ous purposes and treating some differently from others."' 60
Thus, it is necessary to make several analytic inquiries before pro-
nouncing a statute violative of equal protection on the ground that
not all individuals similarly situated are treated identically.
Initially, it must be decided whether either a "suspect classi-
fication" or a "fundamental interest" is involved. When such clas-
sifications or interests are at issue, the variation in -treatment of
individuals under a given law must be shown to be essential to
some overriding state interest.' 6' "Suspect classifications" in-
clude race, 162  national ancestry (lineage) ,163 alienage,' 64  and
wealth. 16 5  In the class of "fundamental interests" are voting,' 66
procreation,' 67 rights with respect to criminal procedure,' 68 and
(in California) education. 169 No court has found such classifi-
cations or interests present with respect to the interests addressed
by Penal Code section 647(ff). 70
If no suspect classification or fundamental interest is in-
159. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 39 CALIF. L.
REV. 341, 346 (1949).
160. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065,
1076 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
161. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
162. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
163. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
164. See Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
165. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235
(1970); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griffin v. Illi-
nois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
166. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
167. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
168. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235
(1970); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956).
169. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
170. In this author's judgment, there is no reason to believe that section 647
(ff), on its face or in its application, discriminates on the basis of any classifica-
tion considered suspect. Similarly, in Colon, 20 Cal. App. 3d at 401, 105 Cal.
Rptr. at 697, the court of appeal found no fundamental interest to be involved.
In the realm of criminal procedure, the only right to be declared fundamental thus
far by equal protection standards, is the right to bring an effective appeal. Grif-
fin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Thus, it is highly unlikely that any other
California appellate court could be persuaded that the implementation of section
647(ff) results in the impairment of a fundamental interest.
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volved, then more traditional standards for evaluating equal pro-
tection claims must be considered:
The distinctions drawn by a challenged statute must bear
some rational relationship to a legitimate state end and will
be set aside as violative of the Equal Protection Clause only
if based on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of that
goal. Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitution-
ally even if source materials normally resorted to for ascer-
taining their grounds for action are otherwise silent, and their
statutory classifications will be set aside only if no grounds
can be conceived to justify them. [Citations omitted.] 171
As suggested by the court of appeal in Colon, "[t]he state
interest in finding a more effective way to deal with inebriates
qualifies as a rational basis . -". What troubled the superior
court in Crazyhawk was that not everyone similarly situated is
treated alike under the statute. 17  Thus, public inebriates ar-
rested in a county without a detoxification center may be treated
differently from their counterparts arrested in a county with such
a facility. Similarly, individuals arrested in, the same county might
not receive uniform treatment. In the one case the treatment de-
cision will turn upon whether or not a detoxification center exists,
and in the other the decision will be dependent upon whether or
not a police officer is reasonably able to place the offender in civil
protective custody.174 Accordingly, in an attempt to find a more
effective way to deal with inebriates, the state appears to have
imposed criminal penalties on some persons but not on others,
though both are "similarly situated," that is, some enjoy the bene-
fit of civil treatment while others suffer the burden of criminal
treatment. 1 5
171. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969)
(emphasis added).
172. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 397, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
173. See Crazyhawk v. Municipal Court, Civil No. 431050 (Super. Ct., Ala-
meda County, Apr. 13, 1973), appeal filed, Civil No. 33522, Ist Dist., July 13,
1973; Public Inebriate, supra note 26, at 552-56.
174. This author takes the position that differential treatment in counties
where detoxification centers are operating can be explained by focusing on the
statutory phrase, "a peace officer, if he is reasonably able to do so, shall place
the person, or cause him to be placed, in civil protective custody." CAL. PEN.
CODE § 647(ff) (West Supp. 1974) (emphasis added). An officer is not "reason-
ably able" to place someone in civil protective custody if sufficient space at the
facility does not exist.
175. In reality the distinction between the two might not be so great. As theSupreme Court in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 529 (1968) noted,
mhe medical profession cannot, and does not, tell us with any assur-
ance that, even if the buildings, equipment, and trained personnel were
made available, it could provide anything more than slightly higher-classjails for indigent habitual inebriates. Thus we run the grave risk that
nothing will be accomplished beyond the hanging of a new sign-reading
"hospital"-over one wing of the jailhouse.
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In constitutional terms such differential treatment is charac-
terized as "under-inclusion. '"176 Although under-inclusion may
be deemed so arbitrary as to deny equal protection, 177 courts that
have upheld under-inclusive statutes have done so on -the rationale
that the legislature must be allowed to take reform "one step at
a time, addressing itself to the phase of 'the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind.' 1 78
Despite such pronouncements by the United States Supreme
Court, the superior court in Crazyhawk attempted ,to insure equal-
ity by taking an all or nothing approach. If a county has a detoxi-
fication facility in operation, everyone must be treated civilly; but
if it does not have such a facility, everyone must be -treated crim-
inally. 179  Such an approach to the concept of equal protection
completely overlooks the justification for a policy of permissible
under-inclusion:
This willingness to tolerate under-inclusion can be jus-
tified by two main considerations. First, administrative ne-
cessity may impose limitations on what a state can do. To
require that the state remedy all aspects of a particular mis-
chief or none at all might preclude a state from undertaking
any program of correction until its resources were adequate to
deal with the entire problem. Second, in some instances, the
state may not be convinced that a particular policy is a wise
one, or it may prove impossible to marshal a legislative ma-
jority in favor of extending the policy's coverage any further.
Thus, to demand application of the policy to all whom it
might logically encompass would severely restrict the state's
opportunities to experiment. 180
In seeking to find a more effective way to deal with public
inebriates, it seems quite reasonable for the California Legislature
to provide for different treatment of individuals arrested for viola-
tion of section 647(f) in counties which have not chosen to oper-
ate and maintain a detoxification facility. Similarly, in counties
which do operate such a facility, it appears reasonable to allow
differing treatment depending upon what a police officer is rea-
sonably able to do under the circumstances, or upon the adequacy
176. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REV. 341 (1949); Developments, supra note 160, at 1084-86.
177. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
178. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955);
McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
179. Alameda County had only a two bed facility in operation at the time of
Crazyhawk's arrest. Brief for Respondent at 9, Crazyhawk v. Municipal Court,
appeal filed, Civil No. 33522, 1st Dist., July 13, 1973. Yet the existence of this
nominal number of beds was sufficient for the court to call for the release of all
simple violators of section 647(f) once they were sober.
180. Developments, supra note 160, at 1085 (footnote omitted).
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of treatment facilities. The pivotal question then may become
whether a county should be required to provide detoxification fa-
cilities. Although courts have on occasion mandated that local po-
litical entities spend resources for certain remedial purposes, 181 the
more commonly applied approach is to approve programs which,
while not encompassing all those who may be affected by the evil
which the Legislature seeks to curtail, nonetheless begin to correct
the perceived problem.' 82 When the success of any single pro-
gram is still unproved, it seems unlikely that a court would re-
quire programs to be established. Rather the broader societal
goal of finding effective solutions is probably best achieved
through local experimentation and subsequent evaluation.
Moreover, rather than providing all with equal civil treat-
ment, the effect of holding that section 647(ff) denies equal pro-
tection to some could be to defeat the very intent of the Legisla-
ture in seeking to find a more effective way to deal with public
inebriates. The court of appeal in McNaught observed:
It might be tragic if section 647, subdivision (ff) had the
effect contended for by defendant. While a decision in his
favor would not invalidate the section, the result would neces-
sarily be that simple section 647, subdivision (f), arrestees
in counties like Santa Barbara must be released. It is any-
body's guess how the Legislature would react to such a hold-
ing. The possibility that the net result would simply be a re-
peal of section 647, subdivision (ff), cannot be overlooked.8'
It is also anybody's guess how the local community would react.
The possibility that local governing bodies would opt to terminate
an existing detoxification program cannot be overlooked.
The United States Supreme Court encountered a similar di-
lemma in ruling upon the alleged constitutional deficiency of Illi-
nois' absentee voting provisions, in McDonald v. Board of Election
Commissioners:8 4
Ironically, it is Illinois' willingness to go further than
many States in extending the absentee voting privileges so as
181. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), requiring the San Fran-
cisco Unified School District to initiate a program of English instruction for Chi-
nese-speaking students. The case was decided, however, under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d) and not on equal protection grounds. More-
over, the facts in Lau are distinguishable from the circumstances under analysis
here, in that ordering expenditures for the establishment of detoxification centers
is not likely to have the same remedial effect upon drunkenness offenders that
mandating the instruction of English to Chinese students is expected to have on
their opportunity for an equal education.
182. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483
(1955).
183. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 572-73.
184. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
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to include even those attending to election duties that has pro-
vided appellants with a basis for arguing that the provisions
operate in an invidiously discriminatory fashion to deny them
a more convenient method of exercising the franchise. In-
deed, appellants' challenge seems to disclose not an arbitrary
scheme or plan but, rather, the very opposite-a consistent
and laudable state policy of adding, over a 50-year period,
groups to the absentee coverage as their existence comes to
the attention of the legislature. That Illinois has not gone
still further, as perhaps it might, should not render void its
remedial legislation, which need not, as we have stated be-
fore, "strike at all evils at the same time." [Citation
omitted.] 185
This author believes that the court of appeal should examine
carefully the superior court's decision in Crazyhawk, with the par-
ticular attentiveness to the legislative purpose of section 647 (ff)
and the concept of equal protection in light of the principle of
under-inclusion. As one commentator has noted: [Slome sacri-
fice of equality and fairness may be required in order that the
legal system preserve sufficient flexibility to evolve new solutions
to social problems.' '1 86
Penal Code Section 849(b)(2).
Despite the considerable judicial controversy surrounding
section 647(ff), section 849(b)(2) has not been subjected to
comparable judicial scrutiny. A class action has been filed re-
cently in San Francisco County Superior Court alleging violations
of the due process and equal protection clauses of the United
States Constitution. 87 Plaintiffs have asked for injunctive relief
to require uniform application of section 849(b)(2). In this au-
thor's opinion, however, a lack of uniformity in the application of
section 849(b) (2) is no more compelling an argument that the
section violates equal protection than the same argument is for
the unconstitutionality of section 647(ff). Through the enact-
ment of section 849(b)(2) the state has exercised a legitimate
interest in seeking to divert individuals arrested for being drunk
in public out of the criminal justice system, when further proceed-
ings are not desirable. Although all those similarly situated are
not treated identically, such differential treatment surely is of
greater benefit to the community and better fulfills the intent of
the Legislature than would the abolition of the diversion pro-
grams.
185. Id. at 810-11 (footnote omitted).
186. Developments, supra note 160, at 1086.
187. Committee of Sober Members of Society (COSMOS) v. Scott, Civil No.
644-265 (Super. Ct., San Francisco County, filed Mar. 30, 1972).
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Moreover, it is doubtful that a judicial forum is the proper
place to seek uniformity in the implementation of seotion 849(b)(2). As noted, police release procedures vary throughout the
state for a variety of reasons. Even policies within a particular
police department are subject to variation. 18 To allow a court
to set uniform policies on a statewide basis, or even in one juris-
diction, may upset the balance between the purposes of the arrest
process in public intoxication cases and the capabilities of the var-
ious law enforcement systems to handle the volume of such ar-
rests. Additionally, extensive judicial involvement might very well
result in judicial usurpation of a legislative function.189  It would
appear more desirable to seek reform in the legislature rather
than in the courts.
WHEN SHOULD No FURTHER PROCEEDINGS BE DESIRABLE?
WHO SHOULD BE REFERRED TO CIVIL
DETOXIFICATION CENTERS?
There remains the unanswered question of when sections
647(ff) and 849(b)(2) should be used by police. The language
of section 647(ff) seems clear: whenever anyone is arrested for
188. See Public Inebriate, supra note 26, at 550-51, for a description of the
variation that can exist within a single police department (San Francisco).
189. A similar separation of powers question arises with regard to the quasi-judicial power exercised by police pursuant to section 849(b) (2). In this connec-
tion, the California Supreme Court, in People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d 89, 94, 473
P.2d 993, 996, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249, 252 (1970), ruled that "[W]hen the decision to
prosecute has been made, the process which leads to acquittal or to sentencing
is fundamentally judicial in nature." Accordingly, in instances prior to the formu-
lation of a decision to prosecute, police and prosecution are permitted to dispose
of cases, since the realm of judicial authority has not been entered. To this point(though based on construction of California Penal Code sections 1000 to 1000.4(drug diversion program)), see the recent companion cases of People v. Superior
Court ex rel. On Tai Ho, 11 Cal. 3d 59, 520 P.2d 405, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1974),
and Sledge v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 70, 520 P.2d 412, 113 Cal. Rptr. 28(1974). In On Tai Ho the California Supreme Court held that, in light of Ten-
orio, the decision to divert, or disposition of the charge, once made by the court,
remains a judicial power and is not subject to the subsequent veto of the prosecu-
tor. 11 Cal. 3d at 65, 520 P.2d at 409, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 25. In Sledge, the
court ruled that the preliminary screening for eligibility for diversion, made prior
to trial but after charging, is not an exercise of judicial power by the prosecutor,
and does not violate the requirement of separation of powers. Id. at 76, 520 P.2d
at 416, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
The court in On Tai Ho stated that the distinction depends "on the substance
of the power and the effect of its exercise." Id. at 68, 520 P.2d at 411, 113 Cal.
Rptr. at 27. The prosecutor's discretionary powers were upheld in Sledge, where
they were based on evidence and "standards prescribed by the statute." Id. at 76,
520 P.2d at 416, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 32. The court thus rejected the due process
and equal protection claims made by the defendant. Id. at n.7, 520 P.2d at 416
n.7, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 32 n.7. These decisions thus suggest that the discretionary
authority vested in local law enforcement agencies is constitutionally permissible
when subjected to an attack based on separation of powers,
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a simple violation of section 647(f), and a police officer is reason-
ably able to place him in civil protective custody, the officer must
do so.190 The court in Crazyhawk suggests that every simple vio-
lator of section 647 (f) should either be referred to a detoxica-
tion center or, if space is not available, be released outright when
sober.' The San Francisco lawsuit (COSMOS) suggests that
everyone should be released pursuant to section 849(b)(2). 92
These approaches are easy to administer and appear to be emi-
nently fair in their application; however, treating everyone ar-
rested for public intoxication alike ignores the possibility that de-
toxification may be more appropriate for some than others, or that,
in some instances, court referral may be in the best interest of
the individual. 9 '
One reason why the courts in Crazyhawk and the plaintiffs
in COSMOS have adopted this all or nothing approach to the prob-
lem is their concern for numerical equality. As one commentator
has noted, however:
The problem with this concept as a guide to action is
that it operates only on the assumption that persons and situ-
ations have already been determined to be relevantly similar;
it does not itself provide criteria of relevance. If all men
were identical-similar in every respect [except] that they
were distinct individuals-the formal rule of equal treatment
would be sufficient, all would then deserve identical treat-
ment in terms of benefits conferred and burdens imposed. It
is obvious, however, that men are not similar in all respects.' 94
190. CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(ff) (West Supp. 1974).
191. Civil No. 431-050 (Super. Ct., Alameda County, Apr. 13, 1973), appeal
filed, Civil No. 33522, 1st Dist., July 13, 1973.
192. Committee of Sober Members of Society (COSMOS) v. Scott, Civil No.
644-265 (Super. Ct., San Francisco County, filed Mar. 30, 1972); see text accom-
panying note 187 supra.
193. For example, should a businessman who has had "one too many" be re-
ferred automatically to a detoxification center for medical treatment while the
"chronic" alcoholic is jailed, simply because the businessman was arrested first
and space at the detoxification facility is no longer available? It would evidence
a strange set of priorities to confer the medical treatment and referral services
of a detoxification facility on the businessman, while the chronic alcoholic is left
to dry out in a drunk tank.
In an attempt to determine how long it takes to dry a man out, the author
consulted various jail medical personnel and watch supervisors during July and
August, 1970. The responses distinguished between the dry-out time needed for
a relatively new offender and that needed by an habitual offender. Most depart-
ments surveyed agreed that it would take from four to twelve hours to dry out
a new offender. Regarding the habitual offender, a further distinction was made
between the time necessary to make the man "street able" and the time it would
take to thoroughly dry him out. Those interviewed agreed that two to four days
would be sufficient to make a man "street able" again. But it would take two
to three weeks, at least, to complete a thorough dry out. Under section 647(ff)
a person may be held a maximum of 72 hours.
194. Developments, supra note 160, at 1164 (footnote omitted).
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To determine the extent to which those arrested for public
intoxication should be viewed as similar and to discover which of
these similarities seem to be relevant in deciding whether to treat
an individual pursuant to section 647(ff) or 849(b)(2), the au-
thor participated in a survey of municipal court policies and prac-
tices regarding public inebriates in San Francisco, Oakland, Los
Angeles, San Diego and Fresno. In examining these policies and
practices, two questions were considered: first, what factors do
municipal courts look to in assessing the similarities and differ-
ences among those arrested for public intoxication; and second,
what are the courts' objectives in sentencing and classifying those
arrested?
Although the term "court policy" will be used loosely to de-
scribe the purposes of various municipal court practices regarding
public inebriates, it should be noted at the outset that courts are
fundamentally different from police departments, in that the judi-
ciary is composed of individual judges within a jurisdiction who
do not necessarily subscribe to uniform policies.
I,t is helpful to visualize the so-called "drunk court" in rela-
tion to the operation and purposes of other courts. Unlike deci-
sions in other cases, in which guilt or innocence is the principal
issue, the judge's decision in "drunk court" is usually confined to
fixing the appropriate sentence. With rare exception, the defend-
ant's plea is guilty. As one author has noted: "matching sen-
tences with men who plead guilty is thus the judge's true con-
cern."1 95
Additionally, the purpose of the "drunk court" differs signif-
icantly from that of other courts. A distinction has been drawn
between two basic types of courts-the legalistic and the social-
ized court:
Legalistic courts operate under an adversary system, by
which a state attorney and a defense counsel plead a case be-
fore a judge and/or jury. The purpose of the trial is to de-
termine whether the defendant in fact committed the crime
with which he is charged. Great stress is placed on formal
proceedings and rules of evidence, very little on information
regarding the defendant's character and background. If he is
convicted, the defendant is subject to fine, imprisonment, or
execution. The punishment fits the crime, not the particular
individual. Socialized courts usually exercise jurisdiction
either over juveniles, both neglected or dependent, and delin-
195. J. WISEMAN, STATIONS OF THE LosT 88 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WISE-
MAN]. The San Francisco Crime Commission estimates that nearly 97 percent
of the drunkenness offenders arraigned in "drunk court" plead guilty. SAN FRAN-
CISCO CRIME REPORT, supra note 42, at 21. For a discussion of the legality of
"drunk court" procedures, see Public Inebriate, supra note 26, at 558-60.
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quent or criminal; or over family law or in some jurisdic-
tions, over both juvenile and domestic problems in one omni-
bus court. Its methods and procedures have made greatest
inroads in the juvenile court. Here, the adversary system is
replaced by one or more social workers' reports, which em-
phasize information regarding the character and background
of all parties. Judicial procedure is informal; rules of evi-
dence do not apply. The purpose of the hearing is to deter-
mine whether a serious problem exists . . . and to provide
the means to meet the needs of the individuals involved.196
The "drunk court" seems to fit best the category of a "social-
ized court."
Introduction to Specific Findings
The following section of this article constitutes a brief sum-
mary of the findings made of the practices and procedures of the
five counties studied during the period herein discussed. Fol-
lowing this introduction is a more detailed description concentrat-
ing individually on each locality.
Of the municipal courts observed, Oakland and San Fran-
cisco appeared to be the most consistent in their policy toward
drunkenness offenders. Fresno appeared to vary somewhat from
judge to judge, while Los Angeles and San Diego deviated the
most from a uniform court policy.
Although often reflecting the policies and practices of indi-
vidual judges as to whether or not an individual is likely to receive
a jail sentence, the courts observed in this study tend to classify
individuals into two broad groups: new or infrequent offenders
and recidivist or habitual offenders. The new or infrequent va-
riety are seldom deemed in need of a jail sentence, whereas recid-
ivist or habitual offenders frequently are sentenced to jail for dry
out, thus interrupting the revolving door cycle of arrest-release-
rearrest. The courts often define these classes differently, how-
ever, creating subclasses within these broad categories, and estab-
lishing sentencing policies that differ widely from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. Despite these distinctions, the objectives of classifi-
cation and sentencing appear to be essentially the same and in-
clude the following:
a. Dryout. If an individual's record indicates a serious
drinking problem, with little hope of his being deterred from fu-
ture overindulgence or helped by an outside agency referral,
every court observed in the study recognized the need for periodic
196. WISEMAN, supra note 195, at 86, quoting Peterson & Matza, Does the Ju-
venile Court Exercise Justice?
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long-term drying out. The attitude expressed was, "if nothing
else, the individual must be kept alive."'' Two courts, San Fran-
cisco and Fresno, virtually have geared their entire sentencing
process toward the ultimate objective of insuring that individuals
in need of drying out receive such treatment. Similarly, every oth-
er court agreed that drying out was an essential function of the
municipal court screening and sentencing process and, accord-
ingly, have made provision for it.
b. Deterrence. Few courts felt that incarceration or fines
serve as effective deterrents to habitual drunkenness offenders.
Regardless of the length of a previous sentence, the habitual
drunk is seldom deterred from returning to the bottle. Some in-
dividuals are arrested again on the very day of their release.
Moreover, the substantial number of drunkenness offenders with
lengthy arrest records appears to discredit court attempts at deter-
rence through jail sentencing. Accordingly, San Francisco and
'and Fresno placed practically no emphasis upon incarceration as
a deterrent device. Oakland and Los Angeles expressed some
belief in deterrence by invoking a progressive sentencing proce-
dure. Although there was little hope of deterring those with se-
rious drinking habits, these courts did attempt to deter a subclass
of offenders who were considered to be on the verge of develop-
ing serious drinking problems. These courts, however, provided
means to avoid the sentence if the individual cooperated in dis-
rupting his drinking pattern. Only one court--San Diego-con-
sistently emphasized deterrence as its basic function in drunken-
ness cases; it therefore released very few drunks without penalty.
The court provided no alternative to fines or incarceration, and
it did determine sentences upon the progressive sentence concept.
c. Release. Virtually every court made at least some provi-
sion for releasing certain drunkenness offenders without penalty.
Most courts were lenient toward new or infrequent offenders, al-
though, in some instances, fines and suspended sentences still
were imposed on this class. The consensus was that a first or sec-
ond time offender did not have a serious drinking problem and
could suffer serious consequences, such as the loss of his job, were
he to be incarcerated."9 8  Generally, the courts felt that there was
nothing the system could do for the individual other than dry him
out and ascertain whether he was in need of immediate medical
attention. Thus, rather than punish him, the court merely warned
the individual of the problems to which a serious drinking habit
197. Interview with a Fresno Municipal Court judge, in Fresno, Aug., 1970.




could lead, and then released him. In addition, most courts pro-
vided release mechanisms for some of those deemed to have ac-
quired habitual drinking patterns. These individuals, the courts
felt, could no longer be deterred, regardless of the sentence. Fur-
thermore, they were generally beyond help, as most had failed
,to take the numerous opportunities presented them by the courts
to seek professional help." 9 Consequently, if the individual
needed no further drying out (for example, if he had just returned
from a lengthy incarceration) and did not request further help,
then San Francisco, Oakland, Los Angeles and San Diego issued
either suspended sentences or straight releases, whereas Fresno
issued a one-day road work sentence.
d. Offer of outside assistance. Nearly every court recog-
nized the shortcomings of the traditional criminal justice system
in its handling of public inebriates. Thus many courts made for-
mal provision in a sentence for outside assistance to those who
requested it or whom the court deemed likely to benefit from it.
Individuals requesting assistance fell into two groups: those seek-
ing merely to avoid incarceration, and those seeking to reverse
the trend in their drinking habits.200  Courts attempted to distin-
guish these two groups and offer assistance only to -those seriously
interested in solving their drinking problems. Among those indi-
viduals who the courts felt would benefit from outside assistance
were those considered to be on the verge of developing serious
drinking patterns. By providing professional help to these individ-
uals on an involuntary basis the majority of the courts surveyed
hoped to inform them of the consequences of habitual drunken-
ness and, in so doing, to assist them in breaking the drinking
habits they had already developed. Thus, San Francisco commit-
ted many of these individuals to weekly sessions of court school;
Oakland, Los Angeles and Fresno, through probation referrals en-
listed the aid of outside agencies to assist those on the verge in
breaking their incipient habits. San Diego, on the other hand,
imposed sentences in an apparent attempt to deter further
public intoxication.
199. Despite the pessimism, a Los Angeles Municipal Court judge admitted
that "nobody knows when an alcoholic will be receptive to rehabilitation. A man
who now works for one of the 'outside agencies' told me he started to change
when he just got tired of going to jail." Letter from a Los Angeles Municipal
Court judge to the author, March, 1971 (copy on file with the author).
200. One San Diego judge is skeptical about the existence of this second group.
He states,
Nor do I believe that it is realistic to ask an alcoholic whether he wishes
court help for his problem. Undoubtedly his answer will be what he
thinks will avoid incarceration, not what is for his own good.
Letter from a San Diego Municipal Court judge to the author, March 1971 (on
file with the author).
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Classification and Sentencing Policies
While all five cities embrace common classification and sen-
tencing objectives including education, drying out, release of non-
problem drinkers, personal assistance and deterrence, significant
variations with regard to classification and sentencing policies were
observed. In dealing with the five cities individually, this section
of the article details those observations.
A. San Francisco. For purposes of sentencing, judges of
the San Francisco Municipal Court, Department 19 ("drunk
court") distinguish generally between new or infrequent offend-
ers and habituals. Additionally, to accomplish various objectives
the judges employ a wide variety of sentencing options, including
court school, straight-time sentences, suspended sentences, and
outside agency referrals. 20 1
The municipal court judge and the San Francisco Police De-
partment Court Liaison 202 act in concert to screen and classify in-
dividual defendants. Prior to court appearances, no steps are
taken to distinguish individual types of public inebriates. During
court appearance, however, *a classification is made on the basis
of physical and social characteristics thought to be indicators of
drinking status.203  Specifically, the San Francisco court seems to
rely on the following:
a. The individual's physical appearance.
i. Is he still shaky and in need of further drying out?
ii. Does he require medical attention?
iii. Is the individual a youth?
b. The individual's prior record.
i. Is the individual a new offender?
ii. Does his record confirm that he may need further
drying out?
iii. Does his past record indicate that referral to an out-
side agency could be beneficial?
201. This description of San Francisco court policies and practices was de-
rived from the author's court observations, as well as interviews with judges of
the municipal court and John Larsen, Court Liaison, San Francisco Police Depart-
ment, in San Francisco, Jul.-Aug., 1970, Aug., 1971, and Aug., 1972.
202. The Court Liaison is an officer with the San Francisco Police Depart-
ment. It is his duty to sit at the bench with the presiding judge and offer advice
in particular cases when requested. The present Liaison, Officer John Larsen, has
had thirteen years experience in this capacity and knows almost everyone who
passes through "drunk court" by name. Many officials believe that his assistance
is most valuable when new judges first begin sitting in "drunk court." The San
Francisco Crime Commission in their report on drunkenness concluded: "His job
is a curious hybrid of prosecutor, defense counsel, and probation officer." SAN
FRANCISCO CRIME REPORT, supra note 42, at 21. See also WISEMAN, supra note
195, at 94-96.
203. WISEMAN, supra note 195, at 89-92.
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c. The Court Liaison's assessment.
i. Is the individual a new offender or a recidivist?
ii. Is the individual in need of further drying out?
iii. Does he have a family to which he can return?
iv. Does he have a regular job?
v. Does he have a permanent address?
vi. Has he been to court school before?204
Applying the applicable characteristics to the individual de-
fendant, the court classifies offenders into two broad groups of
"new" (or infrequent) offenders, and "habituals." The "new"
group consists of youths and persons seldom arrested for alcoholic
offenses, while the "habitual" group is composed of individuals
frequently arrested. Habitual subclasses include individuals who
need further drying out, individuals who do not need further dry-
ing out, candidates for outside agency referral, and those in need
of medical assistance.
Concerning sentencing, youths and persons seldom arrested
for alcoholic offenses are required to attend a court school on alco-
holism as a condition of probation.'" Even if the individual is
classified as an habitual, however, he may be required to attend
the school if he has never done so before. Thus, a fundamental
goal of the San Francisco model for sentencing and treatment of
drunkenness offenders is to expose virtually every offender, sooner
or later, to the alcoholism school. The purpose is to educate
those who may have a serious drinking problem but who may
not recognize it.
In San Francisco, straight jail sentences are infrequently pre-
scribed for those arrested for section 647(f) violations, though
some individuals do receive from ten- to fifteen-day sentences.206
204. Interviews with John Larsen, Court Liaison, San Francisco Police Depart-
ment, in San Francisco, Jul.-Aug., 1970. The author also personally observed
"drunk court" proceedings during this period.
205. This author attended four weekly sessions of the court school during July
and August, 1970. The court school is designed to create an awareness and un-
derstanding of problem drinking through an educational experience. To achieve
this objective, the program provides authoritative and current information about
the symptoms, progressive nature, and consequences of the disease of alcoholism;
visible evidence that alcoholics can and do recover; and information about sources
of help in the community and how to obtain that help. The four weekly sessions
that an individual is required to attend emphasize a variety of themes including
the medical, social-psychological, and legal aspects of alcoholism. Classes are
continuous throughout the year and are conducted by judges, doctors, members
of Alcoholics Anonymous, and representatives of the National Council on Alco-
holism. See generally Levin, The San Francisco Court School for Alcoholism
Prevention, 53 A.B.A.J. 1043 (1967).
206. For a rough breakdown of the length of sentences given drunkenness of-
fenders in the San Francisco County Municipal Court, see WISEMAN, supra note
195, at 92-93.
The following statistics from the San Francisco Court Liaison indicate ap-
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The basic prerequisite for such a sentence is the individual's need
for a "drying out." Drying out is deemed necessary when the per-
son has been arrested repeatedly over a short period of time, or
when he exhibits physical signs of overindulgence in alcohol which
appear to be impairing his faculties or his health (shaking, slurred
speech, an inability to stand erect, or numerous cuts and bruises).
Thus, these short term sentences may be described more accu-
rately as recuperative than as punitive.
By far the largest class of alcoholic offenders processed
through the San Francisco court system have already attended
court school; they need no further drying out and consequently
,are given -thirty-day suspended sentences. Since it appears that
few of the "suspended sentences" are reinstated if violated, they
may in reality be considered releases without further condition.
20 7
A small number of individuals, perhaps fifteen to twenty per
week, are interviewed by a local chapter of the Christian Mis-
sion,2 °s Alcoholics Anonymous, or Clarandon Hall Detoxification
Program. These organizations offer help to anyone requesting it,
but they admit that only those individuals expressing "sincerity"
and "motivation to control their drinking" are likely to benefit
from treatment°.20  The court's sentencing process is in no way
influenced by the individual's cooperation with these outside
'agencies. Thus, the individual is deemed to display the requisite
sincerity and motivation for treatment if he later appears at the
agency voluntarily after court processing.
Individuals requiring medical attention are referred ito the
county hospital by the court. Since the San Francisco Police
Department releases most of those in need of medical attention
prior to court appearance, the number referred by the court is
relatively small.
Although a variety of sentencing options exist for the court,
proximately what percentage of individuals received straight-time referrals to
county jail from 1969 through the first six months of 1972. The Police Depart-
ment's new release policy was initiated in November, 1971.
Number Drunk Number Sentenced Precentage Sentenced
Year Arrests To County Jail To County Jail
1969 16,212 3,893 23%
1970 16,914 3,397 20%
1971 16,488 2,280 14%
1972 7,500 948 13%
207. Since the adoption of the new release policy by the San Francisco Police
Department, judges of the municipal court have tended to impose sixty-day rather
than thirty-day sentences. Interview with John Larsen, Court Liaison, San Fran-
cisco Police Department, in San Francisco, Aug., 1970.
208. For a description of the Christian Missions, see generally WISEMAN,
supra note 195.




in practice, sentencing is most often predicated simply upon an
individual's need for further drying out and upon whether he has
previously attended court school. Since some inebriates are too
incapacitated for immediate release, a short straight-time sentence
often is imposed. If the individual appears to be an habitual, but
has not previously attended court school, the court imposes the
school alternative.21 ° Those offenders who participate in individ-
ualized treatment do so voluntarily and with no incentive to avoid
sentencing.
B. Oakland. Although, in light of the superior court deci-
sion in Crazyhawk 11 few section 647 (f) violators are now being
sent to the Oakland-Piedmont Municipal Court, a description of
the court's former policy is nevertheless useful for this analysis.
As in San Francisco, Oakland's former sentencing policy ap-
peared to distinguish initially between new or infrequent of-
fenders and habituals or recidivists. Judges of the Oakland-Pied-
mont Municipal Court formerly used a complex sentencing policy
-to accomplish a variety of purposes in public drunkenness cases.
The policy combined continuances, suspended judgments, and
modified sentences with clinical treatment, straight-time sen-
tences, county hospital referrals, and a variety of widely used pro-
bation alternatives.212
While pursuing the objectives of personal assistance, dry-
out and deterrence, the primary classification procedure used for
sentencing in the Oakland-Piedmont Municipal Court was based
upon an individual's prior arrest record. Unlike San Francisco,
the prior record in Oakland was utilized as a criterion for objec-
tive, rather than subjective, judgment. Thus, a particular arrest
record would almost automatically dictate a particular sentence.213
If the record indicated eligibility for release or suspendedjudgment, a second criterion-the individual's physical condition
-was considered. Of course, if the person was in apparent need
of medical assistance, he was referred to a county hospital. Oth-
erwise, the judge made a determination of the defendant's physi-
cal condition by having him hold out his hand. Those whose
210. Interview with John Larsen, Court Liaison, San Francisco Police Depart-
ment, in San Francisco, July, 1970.
211. Crazyhawk v. Municipal Court,, Civil No. 431050 (Super. Ct., Alameda
County, Apr. 13, 1973), appeal filed, Civil No. 33522, 1st Dist., July 13, 1973.
See text accompanying notes 156-160 supra.
212. This description of Oakland-Piedmont Municipal Court policies and prac-
tices is derived from the author's personal court observations and interviews withjudges on the Oakland bench and Alcoholism Rehabilitation officials during July,
1970. Also, information was obtained by correspondence with various judges in
March, 1971.




hands were shaky were returned to jail for further drying out.214
The judge acted as the principal screening mechanism for
sentencing purposes, without the aid of an outside agency or po-
lice liaison. For those defendants requesting help in the form
of treatment, however, a more extensive screening and classifica-
tion took place. Individuals were interviewed in the city jail by
the Oakland Alcoholism Rehabilitation Clinic. Those who the
Clinic determined would benefit from treatment were then recom-
mended 'to the court. Criteria that significantly influenced the in-
terviewer included: drinking patterns, employment, standard of
living, family background, arrest record, and prior alcoholism
treatment, if any.215
In view of the characteristics identified by the court and the
Alcoholism Rehabilitation Clinic, a classification pattern similar to
that in San Francisco emerges. Public inebriates were divided
initially into two broad groups of individuals: "new" (or infre-
quent) offenders and "habituals." The "new" class was com-
prised of youths never arrested for public intoxication before and
individuals who had been arrested fewer than three times in the
past six months, and who did not need further drying out. The
"habitual" group included several subclasses: individuals in need
of further drying out, individuals with three or more arrests in the
past six months, candidates for outside agency referral, and indi-
viduals in need of medical assistance.
For purposes of sentencing,21 youths never arrested before
were given a sixty-day continuance on the court calendar on con-
dition that they kept their records clean. If they complied, they
did not need to return to court on the sixtieth day, and the case
was dismissed. Such a policy served the double function of deter-
ring further offenses of a similar nature, and giving a minor the
opportunity to maintain an unblemished record.
First offenders who were rearrested within six months and
who were not released pursuant to section 849(b)(2), appeared
in court and were given a suspended sentence, unless they were
in such physical condition that immediate release was not advis-
able. Those requiring medical attention were referred to a county
hospital, and those needing further drying out were returned to
jail under a two-day jail sentence, usually to be released, how-
ever, by 8 a.m. the following morning.
214. Id.
215. Interview with an official from the Oakland Alcoholism Rehabilitation
Clinic, in Oakland, July, 1970.
216. The description of sentencing policies was derived from the combination
of sources cited supra note 212.
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Second offenders rearrested within six months were issued
thirty-day jail sentences which were suspended for ninety days.
If the individual did not appear for a like offense within -the ninety
days, no time would have to be served. An incentive to "break
the habit" was therefore provided.
Third offenders within six months were given thirty-day
straight-time sentences unless the defendant requested to see a
doctor or psychiatric social worker for his drinking problem. If
an individual returned to court with "hanging time over his head,"
the bench, recognizing the pattern that often led to the "revolving
door cycle,"' 17 took special steps to cope with the arrestee's poten-
tially serious problem. Such individuals were sentenced at their
own option, but if they did not request help, the straight thirty-
day sentence would stand. For those who did request help,
however, a forty-five day sentence would be issued with one day
served and forty-four suspended. The court subsequently re-
ceived a report based on an interview held with the defendant
by a social service agency representative. The report recom-
mended either that the court let the sentence stand, that it reduce
the sentence to the time already served, or that a superior court
hearing for dipsomania or inebriety be held.
If a sentence was modified after the court received an eval-
uation of those serving the one-day sentence plus forty-four sus-
pended, the defendant was remanded to the Oakland Alcoholism
Rehabilitation Clinic, where a nurse administered antibuse or lib-
rium prior to release. Since the court was not permitted to com-
pel an individual to take medication, he could refuse to cooperate.
The modification of sentence, however, usually was conditioned
upon the defendant's cooperation with the Alcoholism Clinic, and
refusal to take the drugs could result in a report of "non-cooper-
ation" with subsequent reinstatement of the forty-five day sen-
tence.
If an individual was sentenced for forty-five days, jail sus-
pended, one day served, and he came before the court again
within six months, he usually received a sixty-day straight-time
sentence. Under these circumstances, the court felt helpless to
solve the individual's drinking problem and simply resolved to
"separate the man from the bottle," in the hope of imposing ab-
stinence. 218
Although Oakland based its sentencing largely upon automat-
ic application of an individual's prior arrest record, outside agen-
217. See generally D. PITMAN & C. GORDON, REVOLVING DOOR: A STUDY OF
THE CHRONIC POLICE CASE INEBRIATE (1958).
218. Interview with a municipal court judge, in Oakland, July, 1970.
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cies significantly influenced the court's final decision. Thus,
screening mechanisms were created by which persons with signif-
icant drinking problems could be detected and offered help.
Those neither desiring help nor needing it were either released
or given straight-time sentences. 219
C. Los Angeles. Los Angeles Municipal Court Division 58
handles most of the skid row and downtown drunks of Los Ange-
les. As in San Francisco and Oakland, judges of Division 58 ap-
pear to make basic distinctions between new or infrequent offend-
ers and recidivist or habitual offenders. As in Oakland, the Los
Angeles courts appear to use a progressive sentencing policy in
disposing of section 647 (f) offenders. Under this model, the
greater the number of drunkenness offenses, the longer the
straight-time sentence. Additional sentencing options include
suspended sentences, probation referrals, and county hospital re-
ferrals. These options combine to accomplish a variety of pur-
poses. 220
Although an individual's prior record is the basis for the Los
Angeles Municipal Court's sentencing policy, the court is not the
initial screening mechanism in the classification procedure for
public drunkenness offenders. Drunkenness offenders are first
interviewed by a representative of at least one of several outside
treatment agencies. Outside agency representatives include a
public health investigator, a representative of the Department of
Hospitals' Rehabilitation Center, a representative of the Salvation
Army, and a representative of Alcoholics Anonymous. 221
Usually, the screening and classification take place moments
219. Everyone released by the court either immediately or after serving time
was provided with the addresses of Alcoholics Anonymous in Oakland and San
Francisco. Those who did not have work or had little money were referred to
St. Vincent de Paul, The Salvation Army, or Goodwill Industries. Indians were
referred to the American Indian Association, women to the Alcoholic Clinic in
Oakland. Interview with a municipal court judge, in Oakland, July, 1970.
220. The description of Los Angeles court policies and practices was derived
from the author's personal observation and interviews with county health and
court officials, August, 1970. Additionally, correspondence with a municipal
court judge in March, 1971, was helpful in providing information about the sys-
tem.
221. According to an undated report co-authored by the senior physician of
the Diagnosis, Evaluation and Referral Center and a public health investigator
with the County Alcohol Program, approximately fifteen arrestees per day
(roughly fifteen percent of those processed through "drunk court") are channeled
into services and programs other than straight jail custody. Of the fifteen ar-
restees per day rechanneled to treatment on summary probation, five are referred
to the Diagnosis, Evaluation and Referral Center, four are referred to the Depart-
ment of Hospitals, five to the Salvation Army, and one is referred to Alcoholics
Anonymous. N. Khoury, M.D., & J. Tillery, Report on Pilot Project on Disposi-
tion of Chronic Drunk Offenders in Los Angeles County (updated report) [copy
on file with the author].
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before the defendant's case is to be heard and occur only a few
feet from the bench. Although any defendant is permitted to be
heard, it is the duty of the outside agency representative to deter-
mine whether or not the defendant will cooperate with and benefit
from a treatment program. The interviewer must make certain
that the individual is not expressing interest in the program simply
to avoid a jail sentence. The representative bases his recommen-
dation on the following factors: the individual's prior drunkenness
arrest record; his demonstrated ability -to interrupt his drinking
pattern in the past; evidence of an arrest-free period; evidence
of former cooperation with treatment programs; the closeness of
family relations; employment; the reasons which the individual
gives for desiring to join the treatment program; and evidence of
a sincere interest in the treatment program.222
It is completely within the discretion of the individual inter-
viewer to analyze responses and to make recommendations to the
bench. Once a determination is made, the representative pre-
sents his suggestions to the court in the form of a note attached
to the defendant's record. If an individual is not in violation of
probation at the time, and if the judge accepts -the recommenda-
tion, the defendant will be given a three-day jail sentence for dry-
ing out, a suspended sentence, and summary probation. 2 3  Terms
of the probation include reporting to public service organizations,
such as the Salvation Army, and cooperating with an appropriate
alcohol program. If the probationer does not cooperate, this fact
is reported to the court, probation is revoked, and the individual
is returned to jail for the remainder of the sentence.224
The recommendation of an outside agency often has a deci-
sive influence upon the court and its sentencing procedure. The
court rarely rejects agency recommendations, 2 15 but if the recom-
222. Author's observation of the interview process and his interview with a
public health investigator, in Los Angeles, Aug., 1970.
223. It is the normal practice to give only probation to those attending Alco-
holics Anonymous. On infrequent occasions, however, individuals attending this
organization are given suspended sentences. Id.
224. A public health investigator for Los Angeles County reported that most
incidents of non-cooperation involve individuals who refuse to take antibuse, a
drug commonly used in treating alcoholic patients. Once the drug is taken, any
alcohol entering an individual's system causes a strong physical reaction (usually
vomiting and sometimes convulsions). Interview with a Los Angeles County pub-
lic health investigator, in Los Angeles, Aug., 1970.
225. A distinction should be made between formal and informal recommenda-
tions. A municipal court judge reports that the only outside agency that formally
makes recommendations to the court is the Health Department. Thus, if a de-
fendant is suspected of having active tuberculosis or some other communicable di-
sease, the Health Department's representative advises the court accordingly. A
sentence is then imposed subject to modification, which enables the Health De-
partment to complete its investigation of the case. Sometimes, a defendant is re-
leased at the request of the Health Department because of the need for medical
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mended referral is refused by the court, or if the agency fails to
make a recommendation, the court must decide on its own what
type of sentence will best serve the needs of the drunkenness of-
fender. The court bases its subsequent sentencing decision al-
most entirely upon the individual's prior record. Of lesser im-
portance is the defendant's general appearance and physical con-
dition.
The criteria utilized by the court and outside agencies in
making sentencing decisions give rise to several classifications. A
new or infrequent offender class is composed of youths and indi-
viduals with only one arrest in the past twelve months. Recidivist
or habitual offenders include subclasses of: individuals in need
of further drying out; individuals with two or more arrests in the
past twelve months; individuals who are referred to outside agen-
cies; and individuals in need of medical assistance.
The sentencing policy 226 for drunkenness offenders in Los
Angeles may be summarized as follows: first offenders or those
who have committed no offense within the past twelve months are
usually issued suspended sentences and are placed on summary
probation for one year. However, as in Oakland and San Francis-
co, those requiring medical attention are referred to a county
hospital. Those defendants needing further drying out--even
though first offenders-are returned to jail.
Second offenders within twelve months are given five days
in jail. They are also required to attend three Alcoholics Anony-
mous meetings a week. Theoretically, offenders are to attend
three meetings a week for a period of one month, and on rare
occasions a defendant is directed to attend for up to three months;
few, however, ever attend.227  The court seems to be more in-
attention which is not available in jail. On the other hand, more informal sen-
tencing recommendations merely suggest that an individual is acceptable for a par-
ticular alcoholic program or that a specific treatment appears best. Both formal
and informal recommendations appear significantly to influence the court. Au-
thor's correspondence with a Los Angeles County Municipal Court judge, Mar.,
1971 (copy on file with the author).
226. In a letter to the author, a Los Angeles County Municipal Court judge
reported the lack of a definite uniform policy for drunkenness offender disposition,
saying:
You are mistaken in assuming that there is a Los Angeles Municipal
Court policy in sentencing drunk offenders. It is the practice in our
court to assign new judges to Division 58. A new judge in an arraign-
ment court will usually adopt the sentencing pattern of his predecessor
as a guideline. With experience, he will probably revise his sentencing.
However, the same judge stated that as a general rule a jail sentence will vary
from five to ten days per prior drunkenness arrest within the twelve month period.
Letter to the author from a Los Angeles County Municipal Court judge, Aug.,
1970 (copy on file with the author).
227. The court is usually able to monitor the number of meetings an individual
has attended by requiring him to send evidence of attendance to the court within
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terested in the number of court appearances an individual has
made than the number of times he attends Alcoholics Anonymous
meetings. Consequently, violation of the probation requirement
to attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings does not usually result
in the revocation of probation and imposition of a jail sentence.
Third offenders within twelve months are given ten-day jail
sentences and are again required to attend Alcoholics Anonymous
meetings; fourth offenders within twelve months are given straight
ten to thirty-day sentences.
In Los Angeles any of these semi-automatic sentences may
be changed at the recommendation of an outside agency. In such
a case the judge refers the individual on a probationary basis to
the organization whose representative made the suggestion. If
the defendant later refuses to cooperate with the outside agency,
probation is revoked and a jail sentence is reinstated.
D. San Diego. The San Diego Municipal Court, Depart-
ment "C," implements its drunkenness policy primarily through
the use of fines and straight-time sentences. Basic distinctions
appear to be made between new or infrequent offenders and
habituals, but little attempt is made to subclassify offenders within
these two basic classifications. In addition, only a few sentencing
options are utilized to accomplish a limited number of objec-
tives.228
The San Diego Municipal Court employs virtually no screen-
ing or classification criteria outside of an individual's prior record.
There is no attempt to solicit help from outside agencies. The
judge initiates and completes the total screening process once an
individual appears in court.
Little if any relation exists between an individual's physical
appearance or condition and the type or length of sentence he
receives. Instead, if the offender appears sincere in his desire
to "kick the habit," the court usually sends him to the roadcamp
for a "good drying out." The rationale is that "the only way to
stop is to do just that. '229
The court makes 'a simple distinction between new or infre-
quent offenders and recidivists for sentencing purposes. "New" of-
thirty days after release from jail. Interview with a Los Angeles County public
health investigator, in Los Angeles, Aug., 1970, and correspondence with a mu-
nicipal court judge, Mar., 1971 (copies on file with the author).
228. The description of the San Diego policy was derived from court observa-
tions and interviews with a San Diego County Municipal Court judge, Aug., 1970.
Additional information was obtained through correspondence with the same San
Diego County Municipal Court judge, Mar., 1971 (copies on file with the author).
229. Interview with a San Diego County Municipal Court judge, in San Diego,
Aug., 1970.
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fenders are generally those who have no arrests, or only one, in
the prior six month period. Those with three or more offenses
within a six month period generally receive longer sentences than
those with only two such offenses.
Offenders appearing in court for the first time within six
months of ,their prior arrest are fined thirty-five dollars and given
a suspended sentence of six months.2"' If the fine cannot be
paid, the offender is allowed to "work off' the amount at five dol-
lars per day while in jail.2 '
Second offenders within six months receive a ten day
straight-time sentence or are returned to jail for the remainder
of the first sentence. Those individuals who are in court for
drunkenness violations three or more times within six months
either are sent to a county roadcamp or, if they are considered ex-
treme habituals, incapable of physical labor, are simply released,
unless they appear in definite need of extended drying out.
E. Fresno. The Fresno Municipal Court appears to distin-
guish between new or infrequent offenders and habitual offenders
and uses a system of fines, probation-referrals, and roadwork to
achieve a variety of objectives.232
230. A San Diego County Municipal Court judge made the following com-
ments regarding the uniformity and flexibility of the court's drunkenness policies:
Since our court rotates its judges through the arraignment depart-
ments, the approach taken tends to vary with the judge. Some attempt
to force the defendant to go to ARC (Alcoholic Rehabilitation Clinic),
AA, or the class on social drinking, while others feel the defendant has
to go to it voluntarily, if it is to be effective. While prior record seems
to be an important factor in the consideration of all our judges, how
many priors, how often, how long since the last and how much of a sen-
tence to give varies quite a bit.
It may be true that our judges do not discuss physical appearance
and socio-economic characteristics in discussing sentencing standards,
but I am sure it is only realistic to note the [sic] most generally poor
physical condition, unemployment and lack of family ties are closely re-
lated to the prior record.
Whether or not an alleged desire to be helped is considered in sen-
tencing, undoubtedly varies with whom [sic] the judge is. If there is a
real attempt to help themselves, it will be reflected in the arrest record
and most, if not all, the judges will consider it. If there is no evidence
of real effort some judges will still refer the defendant to one of the
agencies or give straight suspended sentences; others will not.
Letter to the author from a San Diego County Municipal Court judge, Mar., 1971
(copy on file with the author).
231. Two recent Supreme Court cases make the incarceration of indigents un-
able to pay a fine highly questionable. In Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235
(1970), the Court held that an indigent could not continue to be held in confine-
ment beyond the maximum term specified by statute because of his failure to sat-
isfy the monetary provisions of the sentence. And in Tate v. Short, 401 U.S.
395 (1971), the Court held that it is a denial of equal protection to limit punish-
ment to payment of a fine for those who are able to pay it, but to convert the
fine to imprisonment for those who are unable to pay it. The procedures em-
ployed by the San Diego and Fresno courts (see text accompanying notes 232-
237 infra) appear to be violative of the Tate holding.
232. The description of the Fresno judicial system was derived from inter-
PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS OFFENDERS
The Fresno Municipal Court employs few screening or classi-
fication criteria other than an individual's prior record. The sen-
tencing and treatment policy is not influenced by any assisting in-
dividual or outside agency, and the most significant additional sen-
tencing criterion is an offender's desire to be helped. 233  The
practice in Fresno is to let the offender's record dictate the nature
of his sentence. Otherwise, only those who are sincerely moti-
vated to stop drinking and are able to convey that motivation to
the court have significant influence on the sentencing decision.
Those with not more than three arrests in a six month period
are considered "new" or infrequent offenders. Within the "ha-
bitual" offender class, further subclassifications are made, which
include individuals who are in need of long-term drying out, and
individuals requesting referral to an outside agency.
If -the person appearing before the court has been arrested
fewer than three times in a six month period, bail is set at twenty-
five dollars and an additional ten dollar fine is imposed. If the
offender is unable to pay, he may "work off' these payments by
serving seven days in jail at five dollars per day.2 4 Alternatively,
if the court considers the individual an habitual, it may sentence
him to one day of county road work. An habitual's physical ap-
pearance, however, may significantly influence the decision
whether to release him without a more extensive incarceration
(dryout). 35 Those individuals who are sentenced to road work
are placed on a county bus in the morning and released that after-
noon. They are provided with lunch and given a chance to dry
out by exercising.2"6 Of course, if the habitual is in obvious need
of a longer drying out, he may be sent to the road camp for
periods ranging from twenty to ninety days.23 7
views with judges and court officials, and from the author's personal court obser-
vations, August, 1970. Correspondence with a municipal court judge, in April,
1971, supplied additional information.
233. Author's court observations and an interview with a Fresno County Mu-
nicipal Court judge, in Fresno, Aug., 1970.
234. But see note 231 supra.
235. Author's court observations and an interview with a Fresno County Mu-
nicipal Court judge, in Fresno, Aug., 1970.
236. This author interviewed members of a road work crew in August, 1970.The individuals appeared to appreciate the chance to dry out by exercising. Al-though the food given to them for lunch was rather meager (sandwiches and
something to drink), for many this was the only solid food they had had for days.They stated that due to the high level of alcohol in their bodies, they probably
could not hold down anything more substantial.
237. A judge of the Fresno County Municipal Court explained that the purpose
of the lengthy road camp sentence is primarily to "keep the individual alive." The
thought is that without an occasional long-term dry-out, an habitual would cer-
tainly die from the amount of alcohol he consumes. Interview with a FresnoCounty Municipal Court judge, in Fresno, Aug., 1970.
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If an individual is arrested more than four times in a six
month period, the court will usually impose a twenty to ninety day
sentence to the county road camp. The sentence is intended to
allow for drying out as well as to provide an opportunity to do
constructive work. If any of the individuals facing the court re-
quests help, the judge will release him subject to probation on
condition that he cooperate with the local Alcoholics Anonymous
or a halfway house. Non-cooperation will result in loss of proba-
tion and reinstatement of the appropriate straight-time jail sen-
tence or fine.
TOWARD AN IMPLEMENTATION MODEL FOR PENAL CODE
SECTIONS 849(b)(2) AND 647(ff)
Given the generally uniform view of municipal courts toward
public inebriates, and considering the apparent objectives of the
criminal justice system in processing these individuals, it is neces-
sary to consider two questions before establishing a model for
uniform implementation of Penal Code sections 849(b)(2) and
647(ff): what basic needs of the individual public inebriate may
be served most effectively by police agencies pursuant to section
849(b)(2) or detoxification centers under section 647(ff), and
what needs are best fulfilled by referral of the individual to the
courts? While both sections 849(b)(2) and 647(ff) provide a
means of accomplishing a short-term dryout and release of public
inebriates, section 647(ff) additionally provides a method of sup-
plying medical assistance, referrals to outside agencies on a volun-
tary basis, and in some instances, long-term dryouts. It is not clear
how much of a deterrent effect these procedures have. 28 In con-
trast, court referral offers a reliable and relatively inexpensive
method of long-term detoxification. Court referral also can result
in some form of involuntary commitment to an outside agency as
a condition of probation, and it may have a deterrent effect on
some individuals, who would prefer to avoid the embarrassment
and stigma of a court proceeding against them and the accompany-
ing criminal record.
In view of the objective of a short-term dryout or sober-up,
section 849(b)(2) appears to be capable of meeting the needs
of most infrequent offenders. Moreover, there would be little
point in utilizing scarce detoxification facility resources in treating
this category of inebriate. Accordingly, most new or infrequent
238. It might be argued that merely detaining an individual in a custodial set-
ting to sober him up would constitute a deterrent for some. On the other hand,
if an individual is released once he is sober, the deterrent effect, if any, would
be minimal. Still, repeated arrest, sober up and release might have a cumulative
deterrent effect. See note 199 supra.
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offenders should be sobered up at the police station and released
pursuant to section 849(b)(2).
Considering the medical problems associated with those in-
dividuals who have developed serious drinking patterns, however,
it would be wise initially to refer habitual offenders to detoxifica-
tion centers pursuant to section 647 (ff).239 Those habituals who,
despite their records, need no long-term drying out should be re-
leased when sober within the seventy-two hour period contem-
plated by section 647 (ff)240 and referred voluntarily to appropri-
ate outside agencies. Of course, if the individual desires to re-
main longer than the seventy-two hour period, he should be able
to do so provided that space is available. 4'
As evidenced by the sentencing policy of many courts, it is
clear that a significant number of inebriates are in definite need
239. A Philadelphia study reports that:
[M]any of [the individuals arrested for public drunkenness] are sick,
both acutely and chronically, both from alcoholism and its effects and
from other significant disorders . . . . Up to one-third of the men re-
quire hospital care; 10 percent urgently.
Philadelphia Diagnostic and Relocation Service Corp., Alternatives to Arrest 45
(1967), cited in Bay Area Report, supra note 57, at 16. The Philadelphia report
compiled the following table:
Rated Need for Cause of Need for Hospitalization
Hospitalization Alcoholism Other than Alcoholism





Not Needed 53.0 67.0
Undesirable 1.0 2.0
Other - 7.0
Percentages overlap to a certain extent because some individuals required hospital-
ization for both alcoholism and other problems. Id.
Chronic alcoholism and the nutritional deprivation which often accompanies
it is associated with "a high frequency of cardiovascular disease, tuberculosis, and
cirrhosis of the liver." Blum, Mind-Altering Drugs and Dangerous Behavior: Al-
cohol, in PREsmENT's REPORT: DRUNKENNESS, supra note 1, at 35. Therefore,
it would seem appropriate to grant habitual offenders priority for receiving medi-
cal attention.
240. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5170.7 (West 1972) provides that:
A person who requests to be released from such facility before 72 hours
have elapsed shall be released if the professional person in charge of the
facility determines the person is not a danger to others, or to himself.
241. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5171 (West 1972) provides in part:
However, a person may voluntarily remain in such facility for more
than 72 hours if the professional person in charge of the facility deter-
mines the person is in need of and may benefit from further treatment
and care, provided any person who is taken or caused to be taken to
the facility shall have priority for available treatment and care over a
person who has voluntarily remained in a facility for more than 72
hours.
If in the judgment of the professional person in charge of the fa-
cility providing evaluation and treatment, the person can be properly
served without being detained, he shall be provided evaluation, detoxifi-
cation treatment or other treatment, crisis intervention, or other inpa-
tient or outpatient services on a voluntary basis.
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of further recuperation beyond the overnight detention provided
by a police agency or the maximum seventy-two hour detention
available under section 647(ff). In light of the need for an ex-
tended period for thorough drying out, court referral would appear
appropriate for these individuals. Referral provides a reliable
and relatively inexpensive method of detoxification. Assuming,
however, that space is available, there does exist a procedure for
extending treatment at a detoxification facility beyond -the seven-
ty-two hours contemplated by section 647(ff). Section 5250 of
the California Welfare and Institutions Code provides that a per-
son detained under section 647(ff) may be certified for up to
fourteen days of involuntary intensive treatment if:
(a) The professional staff of the agency or -facility pro-
viding evaluation services has analyzed the person's condition
and has found the person is, as a result of mental disorder or
impairment by chronic alcoholism, a danger to others, or to
himself, or gravely disabled.
(b) The person has been advised of, but has not ac-
cepted, voluntary treatment.
(c) The facility providing intensive treatment is
equipped and staffed to provide treatment, is designated by
the county to provide treatment, and agrees to admit the
person.242
Certification for involuntary treatment is governed by a strict
set of procedural rules. For a person to be certified for intensive
treatment, a notice of certification must be signed by the profes-
sional person, or his designee, and by a physician or certain other
specified individuals. 4a A copy of the certification notice must
be personally delivered to the person certified, filed with the su-
perior court, and sent to the person's attorney, the district attor-
ney, the public defender, the facility, and the State Department
of Health, as well as anyone designated by the detained individ-
ual.244 Additionally, the person delivering the copy of the notice
of certification to the person certified must inform the individual
of his legal right to a judicial review by habeas corpus and of his
right to counsel. 4 5 Involuntary treatment can be imposed for no
more than fourteen days and must terminate as soon as, in the
opinion of the professional person in charge of the facility, the
individual has improved sufficiently for him to leave, or is pre-
pared to accept voluntary treatment. 46
Despite these detailed procedures, it would appear that cer-
tification for treatment beyond the seventy-two hour period con-
242. Id. § 5250.
243. Id. § 5251.
244. Id. § 5253 (West Supp. 1974).
245. Id. § 5252.1 (West 1972).
246. Id. § 5254.
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templated by section 647(ff) could be accomplished efficiently,247
while protecting the rights of the individual. 24  Of course, civil
detoxification treatment remains contingent upon the availability
of adequate resources. It is likely that most jurisdictions could
not at this time offer prolonged treatment to everyone in need
of it.249 Consequently, court referral is likely to be neces-
sary in instances where long-term dryouts are needed by some
habitual offenders and space is unavailable in detoxification facili-
ties.
Besides aiding habitual offenders who need long-term dry-
outs but are unable to be placed in detoxification facilities for a
lengthy period, court referral may be appropriate for those fre-
quent or recidivist offenders who are considered to be on the
verge of developing habitual drinking patterns. (Perhaps, as
some courts appear to believe, these individuals may yet be de-
terred from becoming habituals.) Moreover, many courts are
capable of referring individuals to outside agencies as a condition
of probation.
After having determined what needs of public inebriates can
be served best by release pursuant to section 849(b)(2), referral
under section 647(ff), and court process, it is now possible to con-
struct a model for uniform implementation of those sections.
PROPOSED MODEL FOR IMPLEMENTATION
Classification of Drunkenness Offenders
If a police agency is -to be successful in implementing a selec-
tive policy of court referrals, it must be able to distinguish those
who should simply be dried out overnight and subsequently re-
leased, from those who are in need of referral either to detoxifica-
tion centers or to court. Consequently, classes of offenders must
be defined: "new or infrequent" offenders, offenders "on 'the
verge" of developing serious drinking patterns, and "habitual" of-
fenders. A description of these three classes can most accurately
be made in terms of municipal court sentencing criteria: prior
247. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5252 (West 1972) sets forth a notice of
certification form to be completed by the appropriate individual at the facility.
This form could be completed in a few minutes with a minimal amount of effort.
248. See Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARv. L. REV. 1190 (1974).
249. Available information indicates that the following counties have operating
detoxification centers or facilities which are about to become operable: Alameda,
Contra Costa, Fresno, Los Angeles, Merced, Monterey, Sacramento, San Diego,
San Francisco, San Joaquin, Santa Clara, Sonoma, and Ventura. Of these, it is
known that the following capacities exist: Alameda, 22 beds; Los Angeles, 20
beds; San Francisco, 10 beds plus more to be added; San Joaquin, 20 beds; and
Santa Clara, 110 beds. Except perhaps for Santa Clara, these jurisdictions hardly
possess the capability to offer prolonged treatment whenever necessary. Inter-
views with police officials in the counties discussed, June, 1974; Public Inebriate
supra note 26, at 544, 546-49.
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record, physical appearance, and social characteristics. Courts
appear to rely most upon an individual's prior record and physical
appearance when classifying him for purposes of sentencing, while
outside agencies seem to place some importance upon certain
social characteristics in determining an individual's receptiveness
to assistance.
Class I (New or Infrequent Offenders)
For the purpose of releasing an individual pursuant to section
849(b)(2), the "new or infrequent" offender class should be
comprised of people arrested no more than once in the prior
twelve months. From court observations plus interviews with
judges and outside agency representatives, the author has dis-
cerned certain physical and social patterns used to describe 'the
new or infrequent offender. Such an offender does not display
the physical effects of extended alcohol consumption.25 ° Conse-
quently, the individual is normally healthy and is quickly dried
out.251 Bruises and cuts do not appear untreated and clothes are
not permanently soiled or badly worn. 252
Socially, a new or infrequent offender is often described as
having more stability in his living pattern than someone on the
verge of serious drinking problems or one considered to be an
habitual. Evidently, his drinking has not operated adversely to
influence this stability.253 As a result, he is likely to be mar-
ried,254 or at least living with someone else, 255 and have regular
employment.256
250. See note 239 supra.
251. For example, in Oakland, San Diego and Fresno, judges would ask an in-
dividual to hold his hand out to see if he could keep it steady. Author's court
observations, Jul.-Aug., 1970.
252. Interviews with John Larsen, Court Liaison, San Francisco Police Depart-
ment, in San Francisco, Jul.-Aug., 1970.
253. The San Francisco Court School indicated that individuals without serious
drinking problems possess more stability in their lives. Author's observations at
San Francisco Court School, Jul.-Aug., 1970.
254. In contrast, the Bay Area Planning Council defines "chronic drunkenness
offender" as a person who has been arrested two or more times in a year for pub-
lic intoxication. The Council interviewed 103 such individuals in the Oakland
area and gathered data on many social characteristics of the group. For example,
concerning marriage, the study found that 37.9 percent of chronic offenders were
never married, 14.5 percent were separated, 36.9 percent were divorced, 4.9 per-
cent were widowed, while only 3.9 percent were married. Bay Area Report, supra
note 57, at 27.
255. Of 103 "chronic drunkenness offenders" interviewed, the Bay Area Social
Planning Council found that only 32 percent live with someone else, while 68 per-
cent live alone. Id. at 28.
256. In the Bay Area Social Planning Council's survey of 103 "chronic drunk-
enness offenders," 33 percent of those interviewed had been employed prior to
incarceration, and 81.5 percent had reported some form of unskilled labor as the
last job they had had. Only 13 percent of those interviewed reported skilled labor,
and only I percent were professionals, while 54 percent of those interviewed had
performed seasonal labor at some time during the past five years. Id. at 30-32.
PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS OFFENDERS
Class H (Offenders "on the Verge")
For purposes of deterrence or providing outside assistance on
an involuntary basis, this category should be comprised of persons
having been arrested only two or three times in the past twelve
months. A person who is on the verge of developing a serious
drinking pattern may begin to show the effects of alcohol on his
appearance and social habits. For example, it may take him
longer to dry out or he may even begin to experience blackouts.
2 7
Similarly, his physical and mental dependence on alcohol may be
affecting his social stability. Thus, he may be having marital dif-
ficulties, living alone in a hotel or other semi-permanent resi.
dence, or experiencing employment problems. 5 s
Class III (Habitual Offenders)
For purposes of issuing a long-term dryout sentence, four or
more arrests in a twelve month period constitutes sufficient reason
to believe that the individual is an "habitual. 125 9  An habituars
dependence upon alcohol will very likely affect his physical ap-
pearance, and cause him to require medical assistance.2 0  Also,
his clothes may be torn and soiled, reflecting an unstable life.
Additionally, because he has a continual drinking habit, he rarely
dries out thoroughly and often experiences blackouts and delirium
tremens.
261
Moreover, the habitual's home or family life is characteristic-
ally unstable. He is usually not married and oftentimes never has
been. His living and employment patterns reflect a total lack of
social ties. As a result, he often lives alone and holds only un-
skilled work, if any at all. 2 2  Frequently, he lives in a hotel rather
than an apartment or house, 263 and the high mobility of the habit-
257. For a description of the distinction between the early, middle and late
stages of alcoholism in terms of physical and social characteristics, see HUMAN
RELATIONS AGENCY, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF REHABILITATION, PROGRESS REPORT OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION ALCOHOLISM PROGRAM 32 (1970).
258. In the Bay Area Social Planning Council's survey of 103 "chronic drunk-
enness offenders," 32 of the interviewees reported that they had lost one or more
jobs because of drinking problems and/or arrests. The report found that, in all,
31 individuals reported losing 76 jobs. Another problem of drinking and/or
incarceration is that after release from incarceration, the individual finds he has
no place to return because his room or apartment has been rented to someone
else. Thus, drinking and/or arrest may be responsible for the high rate of
mobility. Those interviewed reported an average of 6.8 different residences
within the past three years. Bay Area Report, supra note 57, at 42, 44.
259. See Table IV in Appendix infra.
260. See note 239 supra.
261. See note 49 supra.
262. See note 256 supra.
263. The Bay Area Social Planning Council reports that 50 percent of the
chronic offenders surveyed lived in hotels prior to incarceration. Only 32 percent
lived in a house or apartment. Bay Area Report, supra note 57, at 34.
1974]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
ual is suggested by the large number of residences in which he
has lived during the last few years.2" 4
It is this author's belief -that if the proposed model for the
implementation of sections 647(ff) and 849(b)(2) were followed
with regard to these classes of inebriates, maximum utilization of
the limited space in detoxification facilities would be achieved2 65
and less court time would be consumed in dealing with public in-
ebriates.
Recommendations
It is suggested that most new and infrequent offenders be
given straight releases pursuant -to section 849(b)(2), after sober-
ing up. All habitual offenders should be referred to detoxifica-
tion centers under section 647(ff). If there is insufficient space
in the detox centers, however, those habituals most in need of
long-term dryouts should be referred to court for appropriate dry-
out sentences. Imposition of a jail term will physically separate
the habitual from the bottle and provide a period for physical
rehabilitation as a result of improved nutrition. Similarly, those
infrequent or recidivist offenders who are considered to be "on
the verge" of serious drinking patterns should be referred to court
in an attempt to deter repeat offenses and to provide appropriate
outside assistance as a condition of probation.
In order to assist police in making a more uniform implemen-
tation of sections 849(b)(2) and 647(ff) (where detoxification
facilities exist), while recognizing -the demands of the system
and the needs of individuals, the following legislative and
procedural proposals are offered. It is suggested that Penal Code
section 849(b)(2) be amended to read as follows (amendments
italicized):
(b) Any peace officer may release from custody instead of
taking such person before a magistrate, any person ar-
rested without a warrant whenever:
(2) The person arrested was arrested for intoxication only,
and
(i) the person is in need of outside medical assistance
and can be referred to appropriate medical facilities,
or,
264. According to the Bay Area Social Planning Council, 63 percent of the
chronic offenders surveyed reported four or more places of residence within a
three-year period. Id. at 36.
See Table V in Appendix infra for a summary of municipal court sentencing
criteria and drunkenness offender classifications.
265. For a list of the detoxification facilities presently in existence in Califor-
nia, see note 249 supra,
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(ii) the detention facility is overcrowded, no further pro-
ceedings are desirable and ,the person is in a condition
to care for himself, or,
(iii) considering the needs of the individual arrested, no
further proceedings are desirable and the person is in
a condition to care for himself.
These amendments would aid police in determining when an
individual should be released pursuant to section 849(b)(2). If
the individual is in need of medical assistance, he should be re-
leased and referred to appropriate medical facilities rather than
be detained for court. Similarly, if the jail is overcrowded, police
should feel free to release individuals who are sober and against
whom no further proceedings are desirable. Finally, regardless
of medical necessity and overcrowding, but considering the needs
of the individual, if no further proceedings are deemed necessary,
then the individual should be released. This final option should
give police sufficient flexibility to release new or infrequent of-
fenders and habitual offenders who do not need long-term drying
out.
With regard to Penal Code section 647(ff), the following re-
visions are suggested (revisions italicized):
(ff) When a person has violated subdivision (f) of this sec-
tion and after considering the needs of the individual, a
peace officer, if he is reasonably able to do so, may place
the person, or cause him to be placed, in civil protec-
five custody if no further proceedings are desirable.
Such person shall be taken to a facility, designated pur-
suant to Section 5170 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code, for the 72-hour treatment and evaluation of in-
ebriates. A peace officer may place a person in civil
protective custody with that kind and degree of force
which would be lawful were he effecting an arrest for a
misdemeanor without a warrant. No person who has
been placed in civil protective custody shall thereafter
be subject to any criminal prosecution or juvenile court
proceeding based on the facts giving rise to such place-
ment. This subdivision shall not apply to the following
persons:
(1) Any person who is under the influence of any drug, or
under the combined influence of intoxicating liquor and
any drug.
(2) Any person who a peace officer has probable cause to
believe has committed any felony, or who has committed
any misdemeanor in addition to subdivision (f) of this
section.
(3) Any person who a peace officer in good faith believes
will attempt escape or will be unreasonably difficult for
medical personnel to control.
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Such revisions would assist in formalizing the discretion
which is now exercised in the utilization of scarce detoxification
resources. By requiring consideration of individual needs, -the ac-
tual recipients of detoxification treatment would be those who
need it most. The clause "if he is reasonably able to do so" is
retained for the reason that if adequate space is not available a
placement need not be attempted. Moreover, if civil treatment
alone is best able to meet the needs of the individual, it should
be used. Otherwise, a straight section 849(b)(2) release or fur-
ther court proceedings may be preferable.
In conjunction with these legislative amendments, which ad-
mittedly continue to leave police without clear, objective guide-
lines, it is recommended that police agencies adopt an 849(b)
(2)/647 (ff) release/referral form, which is reproduced in the ap-
pendix hereto. The form is designed to assist objectively in de-
termining when further proceedings should or should not be insti-
tuted in specific cases of public intoxication, and who should be
referred to available detoxification facilities. The utilization of
such a standard form will tend to minimize the discrepancies in
implementation which are prevalent today, and thereby more sat-
isfactorily provide equal treatment for those similarly situated.
CONCLUSION
This article has explored the varying interpretations and
methods for implementation of California Penal Code sections
647(f), 849(b)(2) and 647(ff) by representative local police
agencies within the state. It has found that police normally arrest
an individual for public intoxication with three basic objectives in
mind: to protect the individual from hurting himself or being
robbed or harmed by others, to dry him out or offer him medical as-
sistance, and to maintain the streets free of such unsightly individ-
uals who are often unable to control their own actions. For a
variety of reasons, however, California police agencies appear to
be placing a lower priority upon the arrest of public inebriates.
Similarly, police appear to be placing a lower priority upon
the processing of drunkenness offenders through the courts. This
is evident from the general increase in the use of dispositional al-
ternatives to prosecution under sections 849(b)(2) and 647(ff).
A study of police policies and practices, however, indicates that the
interpretations given these sections by the various police and
sheriff's departments are substantially inconsistent. There is, for
example, little or no uniformity among 'the various agencies ob-
served as to the criteria for determining when "no further pro-




Guidelines for interpreting and implementing these statutes
are lacking, as the Legislature and municipal courts have left po-
lice largely to their own instincts in implementing Penal Code sec-
tions 849(b)(2) and 647(ff). The result has been that, for the
most part, police have chosen to view section 849(b)(2) as neces-
sary for maintaining a proper balance between the purposes of
the arrest process in public intoxication cases and the capabilities
of the system to handle the volume of such arrests. Likewise,
police referral policies under section 647(ff) appear to be shaped
by a concept of "need." Rather than focusing upon the needs of
the system, however, as has been the experience under section
849(b)(2), and under section 647(ff), the police have focused
upon the needs of the individual.
Despite a lack of uniformity in implementation, Penal Code
sections 849(b)(2) and 647(ff) provide a constitutional means
for dealing with public inebriates, while helping to relieve the
criminal justice system of the burdens created by arresting these
individuals. When scrutinized against the principles of equal pro-
tection of the law and in light of the concept of permissible under-
inclusion, the conclusion reached is that some sacrifice of true
equality may be required in order that the legal system preserve
sufficient flexibility to evolve new solutions to social problems.
Rather than adopting an "all or nothing" approach in deter-
mining when no further proceedings should be desirable, or who
should be referred to civil detoxification centers, the author sub-
mits that it is necessary to determine in what respects public
inebriates are similar and to decide which of these similar charac-
teristics are relevant to the kinds of treatment the inebriate should
receive.
By focusing both on the practicalities of the system, with its
limited resources, and the needs of the individual, this article has
tendered a classification model that will facilitate treatment and
sentencing in terms of individual needs and has suggested some
statutory amendments for implementing sections 849(b)(2) and
647(ff) in a uniform and effective manner. It has questioned
pursuing court process in circumstances where police agencies and
detoxification facilities are capable of achieving judicial objectives.
However, unlike some courts2"6 and commentators,26 7 this au-
thor does not recommend the total abandonment of the criminal
framework for dealing with the public inebriate. Faced with
the reality of inadequate resources to deal with all public in-
266. See Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966); Easter v. District
of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
267. See, e.g., H. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 259, 345-
47 (1968); Public Inebriate, supra note 26, at 540, 562.
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ebriates in a civil or medical context" 8 and the need for
some form of public care when the inebriate is unable to care
for himself, the use of the criminal process as a means for dealing
with the public aspects of problem drinking clearly has social
value.269 Moreover, considering the absence of a reliable cure
for alcoholism, the choice between civil or criminal -treatment may
be in reality more a matter of form than substance.2 70  Therefore,
instead of debating the ultimate propriety of treating a public
inebriate in a civil as opposed to a criminal setting, this article sug-
gests that the uniform implementation of Penal Code sections 849
(b)(2) and 647(ff) would provide a practical and legal means
for diminishing the use of the criminal process while fulfilling the
objectives behind arrest for intoxication and -the needs of the pub-
lic inebriate.
On the surface, uniform implementation of this proposed
classification scheme promises to reduce the load upon our courts
by diverting many individuals who would otherwise be processed
through the criminal courts to appropriate non-criminal treatment
programs, or by releasing them outright. Yet in reality, even with
a substantial reduction in the number of individuals processed
through the courts, such a classification scheme might not signifi-
cantly diminish the courtroom burden, since many courts today
spend only a minimal amount of time in summarily processing
drunkenness offenders. Few courtroom hours would be deleted
from the docket and few judges would be freed for other duties.
Instead, the benefits of employing a classification model for drunk-
enness offenders pursuant to sections 647(ff) and 849(b)(2) will
stem from a redistribution of court time, detoxification resources,
and outside agency assistance. This will result in more individ-
ualized treatment to fit the particular needs of each public ine-
briate. At the same time, such a redistribution will benefit society
through a more effective allocation of its resources by limiting
their application to those individuals who are in need and who are
likely to respond to individualized treatment.
268. See note 249 supra for a list of the detoxification facilities and their
available capacity in California at the present time. The United States Supreme
Court in the case of Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 528 (1968), observed that
"[Flacilities for the attempted treatment of indigent alcoholics are woefully lack-
ing throughout the country." The Court also noted that,
inhere is little likelihood that the number of workers in these
fields could be sufficiently increased to treat even a large minority of
problem drinkers. In California, for instance, according to the best esti-
mate available, providing all problem drinkers with weekly contact with
a psychiatrist and once-a-month contact with a social worker would re-
quire the full time work of every psychiatrist and every trained social
worker in the United States.
Id., quoting Cooperative Commission on study of Alcoholism, Alcohol Prob-
lems 120 (1967) (emphasis in original).
269. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 530 (1968).
270. See note 175 supra.
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A. Overriding circumstances indicating definite
849(b) (2) release or 647(ff) referral:
1. Individual is in need of medical assistance.
2. Detention facility is overcrowded, individual
is now sober and no further proceedings are
desirable.
B. Overriding circumstances indicating definite
court-referral:
1. Defendant is not simple 647(f) violator.
2. Defendant requires long-term dryout and
appropriate detoxification facilities are
unavailable.
3. Defendant requests court referral.
C. If none of the above applies, determine which


















b. Living with someone Likely
Yes No
Class II Class III














hotel) Unlikely Likely Likely
d. Employment
(skilled, regular) Likely Unlikely Unlikely
_ Class I Release 849(b) (2)
_ Class II Refer to Court
_ Class III Refer to detox (647(ff)) (unless long-term dryout,
necessary and space at detox unavailable, then refer
to Court)
For the release/referral form to operate with a minimum amount of
time and effort, the Fresno booking card for drunkenness offenders
should serve as a model to all departments. In Fresno, a small filing
cabinet situated next to the booking counter contains a separate four
by six inch card for each drunkenness offender arrested. Within a
matter of seconds an officer can determine how many times and on
what dates a particular individual has been arrested for being drunk. If
a department were to maintain an accurate and complete card file
solely for drunk arrestees, drunks could be processed with a minimum
of time and questioning. A recommended drunk arrest booking card
is reproduced on the following page.
,[Vol. 15
1974] PUBLIC DRUNKENNESS OFFENDERS






Length of Time At
This Address: Lives with:
1. SomeoneOccupation 2. Alone
How long:












Booking Date Date Injury, (court, hospital,
Number Received Released Illness 849(b) (2), 647(ff))
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